


JPRS-TND-93-004

5 February 1993



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-93-004

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5 February 1993

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Asian-Pacific Conference Held on Arms Transfers

OW2601024593 Tokyo KYODO in English 0130 GMT
26 Jan 93

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 26 KYODO—Representatives from 17 Asian-Pacific countries opened a two-day conference Tuesday in Tokyo on promoting transparency in arms transfers.

The head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's United Nations Bureau, who opened the workshop, urged the nations of Asia and the Pacific to join the U.N. register of conventional arms to improve international monitoring of the arms trade.

"Japan strongly hopes all U.N. member states will fully understand and support the purpose and content of the register as we move now to the next phase of its actual implementation," said Haruhiko Shibuya, the U.N. bureau chief.

The register was created in January 1992 at the initiative of Japan and the European Community.

U.N. members are expected to make their first voluntary reports to the registry on 1992 arms exports and imports by the end of April. Many Asian countries still have reservations about the register, however, Japanese officials said.

"The register does not itself control armaments, but it nevertheless contributes to world peace and stability by enhancing transparency in armaments and thus fostering confidence-building among countries," Shibuya said.

The meeting, for which Japan and the U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs were the hosts, is one of four promotional workshops being held in different regions of the world.

China and Pakistan, which abstained on a draft resolution on the registry when the idea was first brought before the U.N. General Assembly, sent representatives to the workshop.

North Korea, which also abstained, did not reply to the invitation to attend the conference.

Also attending the workshop were Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Singapore, The Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam.

Shibuya said it is important for countries in the region to promote political and security dialogue "so that transparency in their respective policies and their sense of mutual reassurance be enhanced."

JAPAN

Probe Into Nuclear Exports to Iraq Suggested

OW2601113093 Tokyo KYODO in English 1056 GMT
26 Jan 93

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 26 KYODO—Japan suggested Tuesday [26 January] it will investigate whether Japanese companies were involved in Iraq's nuclear development program prior to the Persian Gulf crisis.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono said it is possible Japanese companies exported items for use in Iraq's nuclear development program before a trade embargo was imposed in the aftermath of Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

"I do not think this is the case but first we must confirm," Kono told a regular news conference.

The Italian head of a U.N. nuclear inspection team said Monday in Baghdad that several Japanese corporations have been involved in Iraq's nuclear development program. Mauro Zifferero stopped short of identifying the companies and did not mention what the Japanese companies supplied to Iraq.

Tokyo To Assist Russia in Warhead Disposal

OW3101075093 Tokyo KYODO in English 0731 GMT
31 Jan 93

[Excerpts] Tokyo, Jan. 31 KYODO—Japan will assist in the disposal of radioactive components from dismantled nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union, but is wary of giving monetary aid for the process, Foreign Ministry sources said Sunday.

The sources said that the government thinks Japan should not be directly involved in the dismantling of the nuclear warheads set by the START II nuclear arms reduction treaty. [passage omitted]

Because of a shortage of funds in Russia, the sources said they expect Russia to ask Japan for financial assistance in the dismantling process.

They said one immediate area where the government is likely to offer Japanese expertise is in the safe disposal of nuclear waste material from the warheads and in the monitoring of radioactive contamination.

Because of a bilateral territorial dispute over four islands to Japan's north which the former Soviet Union seized at the end of World War II, the Japanese Government has maintained it is unwilling to offer large amounts of monetary assistance to Russia.

Japan has also taken the view that the disposal of nuclear weapons is basically the responsibility of the country which possesses them.

The matter is likely to be a major topic for discussion at the July summit of leaders of the seven major industrialized nations in Tokyo.

Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant Planned*OW2201061293 Tokyo KYODO in English 0600 GMT 22 Jan 93*

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 22 KYODO—Electric utilities and other companies involved in Japan's atomic energy business plan to establish a new plant to recycle spent nuclear fuel, industry sources said Friday.

The sources said the group hopes to build the center in the northern Japanese village of Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture, in order to recycle the plutonium and uranium mix created by nuclear power plants.

The group of companies hopes to submit a blueprint of the project to village authorities for approval by the end of next year, they said.

The proposed plant will be used to produce a fuel mix consisting of highly toxic plutonium recovered from spent nuclear fuel and powdered uranium dioxide for use as fuel mainly in light water-type reactors.

An estimated five tons of plutonium will be retrieved from spent nuclear fuel annually, the sources said.

The companies joining the project are electric power suppliers and eight atomic power equipment and fuel makers, including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., Toshiba Corp., and Mitsubishi Materials Corp.

They hope to start operating the new plant in the year 2000, the sources said.

NORTH KOREA**Japanese 'Nuclear Suspicion' Decried***SK271060193 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0505 GMT 27 Jan 93*

["Boloney To Attain Sinister Aim"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, January 27 (KCNA)—Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa, in his policy speech at the Diet some time ago, again came out with fictitious "nuclear suspicion" against the DPRK, saying the "suspicion has not been dispelled" and the "future prospect" of the normalization of diplomatic relations is subsequently "opaque."

This tells that he is actually not interested in the normalization of diplomatic relations between the DPRK and Japan but trying to put some insidious pressure on the DPRK, a NODONG SINMUN analyst today says, and goes on:

Talks for the normalization of diplomatic relations have been held between the sides time and again, but without a progress. Japan is entirely to blame for this.

Japan must sincerely apologize and make adequate compensations for the immeasurable misfortunes and disasters imposed upon the Korean people in the past. She has intentionally created difficulties in the way of the talks by unreasonably and persistently bringing up "nuclear suspicion" as a precondition for the normalization of

diplomatic relations, while working hard to justify her past crimes and avoid her responsibility for compensation.

The honesty of our peaceful nuclear policy is recognized by the broad world public.

Nevertheless, the Japanese authorities are still insisting on the "removal of nuclear suspicion" as a precondition for the normalization of diplomatic relations. This cannot be construed otherwise than an act of groundlessly slinging mud at us and, at the same time, an intention to deliberately lay difficulties in the way of the talks for the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries in the future, too.

The unreasonable cavil and attempts to put some pressure on us over the "nuclear suspicion" only reveal the arrogance of the Japanese authorities who pose Japan as a "political power."

It depends on the attitude of Japan whether diplomatic relations are normalized between the DPRK and Japan in keeping with the expectations of peoples of the two countries, or not.

Official Cites South's N-Arms Development*SK2801144993 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1140 GMT 28 Jan 93*

[Text] Pyongyang, January 28 (KCNA)—Ho Hyok-pil, vice-director of the Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF), told home and foreign reporters here today about the DPRK's principled position toward the problems arising in the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The press conference was sponsored by the CPRF on the lapse of 35 years since the U.S. imperialists began to ship nuclear weapons into South Korea. Ho said the most important problem in the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was to get the U.S. nuclear weapons totally withdrawn from South Korea, make its result open to the public and carry out an overall inspection of the U.S. nuclear bases in South Korea.

The development of nuclear weapons by the South Korean authorities must be checked and the nuclear weapons deployed around the Korean peninsula must also be removed, he said.

The nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula was caused by the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea and has yet to be solved because there still exist nuclear weapons in South Korea, he added.

He mentioned the role that should be played by the countries concerned in the denuclearization of the peninsula.

The countries concerned are also responsible for the denuclearization of the peninsula and must discharge their duty, he noted, adding that what is most urgent is the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea.

He said Japan's nuclear armaments could not but be another obstacle to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Declaring that U.S. nuclear weapons still remain in South Korea in actuality although former U.S. President Bush declared that the tactical nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from Asia and the South Korean authority made a "declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons", he explained the ground [as received] as follows:

Firstly, it is entirely impossible to withdraw in a few months so vast amount of nuclear weapons, facilities and bases which had been systematically introduced and deployed in South Korea for 35 years. The nuclear weapons brought into South Korea number 1,000 pieces or more at the modest estimation and they total more than [number indistinct] according to figures published in the South Korean press.

Secondly, no one witnessed or was present at the scene of the withdrawal of so vast amount of nuclear weapons.

Thirdly, there still remain in South Korea U.S. nuclear bases, launching devices, control setup and nuclear tactical units. Fourthly, the construction of nuclear storages and officers employed at nuclear bases testified that there had been nuclear weapons there in the past and nuclear-powered submarines carrying nuclear weapons were still frequenting there. [sentence as received]

Fifthly the South Korean authority who had said he was utterly in the dark with regard to the presence or absence of U.S. nuclear weapons and could not know about it suddenly made a "declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons" before the United States made a "declaration on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons." This must be a ridiculous lie.

The United States and the South Korean authorities are putting military pressure on the DPRK over "suspected nuclear arms development" by it, he noted, and stressed:

The DPRK Government will never yield to the military pressure of the United States and its satellite states but will confront it with a principled, tough stance.

It is inconceivable in the future, either, that we refrain from what we have to do, or we promise to do what we cannot do under military threat from others.

As we have declared repeatedly, we have no nuclear weapons, we have neither intention nor capacity to produce nuclear weapons and we do not feel any need to possess them.

We have so far undergone inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) five times since May last year because our nuclear policy is just. In this course, the honesty of our nuclear policy has been fully proved.

Noting that the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee failed to make progress in its work, Ho said it was because the South Korean authorities, departing

from an independent stand, were hindering the discussion of the inspection rules under the manipulation of the United States.

The "president-elect" of South Korea recently argued that the "nuclear problem of the North" must be solved with the help of the U.N. Security Council, if necessary, he noted, branding this as treacherous remarks.

Ho Hyok-pil stressed:

We have no "nuclear problem." We are undergoing and will undergo inspection by the IAEA. There is no ground, therefore, to take the "nuclear problem of the North" to the U.N. Security Council.

The fact that we do not develop nuclear weapons will be made clearer through inspections by the IAEA and will be naturally known to all when the joint declaration on denuclearization is put into effect through North-South dialogue.

Our nation will not pardon the treacherous attempt to internationalize with the backing of outside forces the problem which can be solved within the nation.

Foreign Ministry Issues Memorandum

SK2901234493 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
2242 GMT 29 Jan 93

["DPRK Foreign Ministry Memorandum on Truth Behind South Korea's Nuclear Arms Development"—KCNA headline]

[Text] *Pyongyang, January 29 (KCNA)*—The DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a memorandum on January 29 exposing the truth behind the development of nuclear weapons by South Korea which is going on under the U.S. "nuclear umbrella."

The memorandum, published on the lapse of 35 years since the United States began its illegal shipments of nuclear weapons into South Korea, consists of "1. Criminal records of nuclear arms development," "2. Status of nuclear armament" and "3. Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is a consistent stand of the DPRK Government."

It cites data proving that South Korea's nuclear development which began to be carried into practice toward the end of the 1960's has been rapidly promoted annually by the successive military fascist "regimes" and it has reached the stage of completion.

The main realms of nuclear armament—nuclear development technology, operation of atomic reactors, extraction of nuclear material, manufacture of nuclear bombs, nuclear testing, possession of nuclear delivery vehicles and establishment of a system of the preparedness of nuclear weapons for action—have been promoted simultaneously and comprehensively in South Korea to bring an integral system into shape, the memorandum says.

The DPRK Government has repeatedly declared it has neither intention nor capacity to develop nuclear weapons and officially vowed not to produce, introduce

or possess nuclear weapons, the memorandum recalls, and adds: Our honesty with regard to nuclear development has been proved practically and verified objectively.

In order to denuclearize the Korean peninsula and preserve peace in Asia, it is essential to check the criminal scheme of the United States and the South Korean authorities for making South Korea a nuclear arsenal with a row over the fictitious "nuclear development" of the North, get the U.S. nuclear weapons totally withdrawn from South Korea and immediately stop the South Korean authorities' nuclear development and nuclear armament, the memorandum emphasizes.

Memorandum Details Developments

*SK3001035893 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 0000 GMT 30 Jan 93*

[DPRK Foreign Ministry Memorandum issued in Pyongyang on 29 January—read by announcer]

[Text] Concerning nuclear weapons development maneuvers pushed ahead in South Korea under the United States' nuclear umbrella:

It is 35 years since the United States began its illegal shipments of nuclear weapons to South Korea.

For the past 35 years, the United States has systematically brought various nuclear weapons into South Korea, turning South Korea into the largest nuclear forward base in the Far East, constantly waging a nuclear threat to our Republic.

For a long time, the South Korean authorities have secretly pushed ahead with nuclear weapons development under the United States' nuclear umbrella. Today, such development has reached a grave stage.

The DPRK Foreign Ministry recognizes that in order to realize the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and ensure peace and security in Asia and the world, it is necessary to expose the truth behind the development of nuclear weapons in South Korea with the United States' tacit approval. Thus, the DPRK Foreign Ministry announces this memorandum.

1. Criminal Record of Nuclear Arms Development.

Nuclear arms development in South Korea, which is under U.S. occupation, has a nearly 30-year history.

South Korea's nuclear development, which began to be carried into practice toward the end of the 1960's, has been rapidly promoted annually by the successive military fascist regimes and it has reached the stage of completion.

a. The construction of a bridgehead for nuclear development.

The Pak Chong-hui regime made nuclear development a policy and built a bridgehead for this. In 1968, South Korea began to plan for the processing of nuclear fuel, which is indispensable to nuclear development.

The United States' nuclear (?scenario) in South Korea and [word indistinct]:

At a meeting of the 172d Atomic Energy Committee in May 1969, the South Korean authorities finalized a plan for the research and development of atomic energy and its long-range utilization, which was a nuclear arms development plan prepared by the Atomic Energy Research Institute (then the Institute of Atomic Energy) for the purpose of pushing ahead with the installation of reprocessing facilities—1990 April edition of the South Korean magazine WOLGAN CHOSON.

In 1971, the South Korean military regime established the Weapons Development Committee—a secret special committee under the direct supervision of Chongwadae [presidential residence] for the development of nuclear weapons—and the (Frazer) Committee in the United States announced that the Pak regime reached a unanimous agreement on pushing for nuclear arms development at the Weapons Development Committee in the early 1970's—1 November 1978, The Final Report on the Koreagate Incident.

In 1970, the Pak regime organized the Agency for Defense Development [ADD] with a ministerial-level director and vice ministerial-level deputy director. Following this, the Pak regime founded in succession the Atomic Energy Research Institute in 1973, a group for the development of nuclear missiles in 1974, and a complex for the development of nuclear fuel in 1976. Thus, the Pak regime completed the framework for nuclear development—1989 April edition of the South Korean magazine SINDONGA.

In November 1974, South Korea concluded a contract with Canada to import a (?tunnel-type) of [word indistinct]. In 1975, South Korea purchased a missile propellant plant from Lockheed—1991 April edition of WOLGAN CHOSON.

In June 1975, Pak Chong-hui stated that South Korea possesses the capability to develop nuclear weapons and clarified that South Korea will belong to the nuclear club within a few years—12 June 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST; 29 June NEWSWEEK.

On 26 September 1978, South Korea test fired a ground-to-ground missile developed by ADD capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and [word indistinct]. For this, foreign journalists began to evaluate South Korea as a potential nuclear state—1989 April edition of the South Korean magazine SINDONGA.

b. The actual condition of the industrial basis of nuclear development.

The Chon Tu-hwan military regime intensified the nuclear development and built its industrial foundation.

Chon Tu-hwan maximized the nuclear research capability by conducting the merger and abolition of research organizations under the government on 19 December 1980, acting as if he had not promoted nuclear development—South Korean YONHAP Yearbook 1981.

In 1982, under the pretext of the issue of nuclear fuel management after becoming independent, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute [KAERI] and the Korea Electric Power Corporation insisted on operating nuclear waste reprocessing facilities capable of reprocessing 250 tons of nuclear waste a year from 1992 and insisted on enlarging gradually the capacity up to 500 tons by 1995 and 1,000 tons by 2000. In the same year, they concluded a \$295,000 contract with the United States' (Bunge Endrew) Company to introduce fast breeder reactor technology in South Korea—1990 April WOLGAN CHOSON and YONHAP Yearbook 1983.

In September 1983, Yi Ki-paek, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made an oral report to Chon Tu-hwan on ROK nuclear policy. With this as momentum, a secret plan to map out a strategy to chose nuclear armament began to be promoted vitally—1991 October WOLGAN CHOSON.

South Korea completed [word indistinct] facilities after a survey on the possibility to extract plutonium in November 1985 and began to operate them full scale in 1987—1990 April and 1991 October WOLGAN CHOSON.

In 1987, South Korea laid out nuclear-capable [words indistinct] with a 256km shooting range, as if it had been in an actual combat—1991 April WOLGAN CHOSON.

On 28 April 1988, David Fisher, former director of the Secretariats of the International Atomic Energy Agency, estimated that South Korea was capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons.

c. Emerging as a nuclear possessor.

The No Tae-u military regime has implemented nuclear development.

On 25 March 1989, the KAERI held a ground-breaking ceremony of a 30,000kw-capacity multipurpose reactor for nuclear development, which it had been promoting, and planned to complete it at the end of 1992—1990 April WOLGAN CHOSON.

In August 1990, South Korean authorities announced a strategic research and development plan to develop a fast breeder reactor, which is necessary for the legitimate purchase of plutonium and to increase its production, and laser spectrum technology. On 9 November 1990, they agreed with Japan to jointly develop technology for a next generation atomic reactor—1991 October WOLGAN CHOSON and South Korean TONGA Yearbook 1991.

At the first scientific and technological skills contest held with No Tae-u in Taedok, South Chungchong Province in 1990, the Taedok declaration on completion of the Taedok Research Town by the end of 1992, four or five years ahead of schedule, was adopted, and a ceremony of its completion was held in the presence of No Tae-u on 27 November 1992—TONGA Yearbook 1991 and MBC-TV 27 November 1992.

After announcing the declaration of denuclearization on 8 November 1991, the No Tae-u regime signed with the United Kingdom an agreement on nuclear waste reprocessing. [Words indistinct] described this as a cleverly-schemed double-sided strategy—1992 December issue of Japanese magazine SEKAI.

Facts show that South Korea was a potential nuclear possessor in the 1970's, became a quasi-nuclear possessor in the 1980's, and is becoming a nuclear possessor in the 1990's.

2. The Actual Condition of Nuclear Armament.

The technology of nuclear development, the operation of an atomic reactor, the extraction of nuclear material, the manufacturing of nuclear warheads, nuclear tests, possession of means of nuclear delivery, and being fully equipped with nuclear arms for an actual nuclear war are basic signs of nuclear armament.

In South Korea, these basic things are extensively being promoted simultaneously and are becoming a completed system.

A. Being equipped with nuclear arms production technology.

South Korea has a large foundation for nuclear research and development. About 20 research organizations are mobilized for nuclear development in South Korea. It has skilled technical manpower numbering as many as 15,000, including some 1,500 experts with doctoral degrees—1991 October edition of WOLGAN CHOSON.

The KAERI has played a pivotal role in nuclear development in South Korea. Its basic task is to research reprocessing technology for obtaining plutonium. The Nuclear Fuel Development Complex, the predecessor of Nuclear Fuel Inc., was established to develop the nuclear fuel [word indistinct] technology, including the technical ability to manufacture nuclear bombs, and acted as a field commander for nuclear development.

South Korea's National Defense and Science Institute is in charge of developing secrete strategic arms, which includes nuclear delivery, basic technology, and a parts-oriented general armament system—1990 April edition of WOLGAN CHOSON and South Korean HANGYORE SINMUN on 18 September 1991.

The Korea Chemical Research Institute conducts research on special explosives, and the Korea Electronic Communication Research Institute conducts research and development of the C3-I system. The Korea Aviation and Space Research Institute is in charge of research and development of artificial satellites.

Also, the Resource Research Institute under the Trade and Industry Ministry of South Korea, posing as an institute for energy resources, is concentrating on locating natural uranium to be used for heavy-water reactors—1989 November and December editions of the South Korean military magazine WOLGAN MILITARY VISION and 1992 April edition of WOLGAN CHOSON.

Many companies, including Nuclear Fuel Inc., Korea Electric Power and Technology, Korea Heavy Industries, Kyongbuk Machine Industries, Korea Dynamite Manufacturing Company, Pungsan Metal Industries, and Hyundai Electronics, are participating in South Korea's nuclear development.

The town of Taedok, which was built for nuclear arms development 20 years ago, has evolved into a general facility for nuclear research, a conning tower [saryongtab] of nuclear arms development. It has 65 research institutes and colleges, 20,000 researchers, and 100,000 residents on 8,340,000 pyong of land—MBC-TV 27 November 1992.

This shows that South Korea's nuclear research and development has been created on a foundation of advanced industrial development, not on simple test development. The South Korean authorities have promoted technological development of nuclear arms behind the scenes of technological development of nuclear energy.

Electric Power Research Institute and Nuclear Fuel Inc. acquired technology applicable to nuclear reprocessing by working jointly on joint nuclear fuel design with a foreign country's technical team and by building and operating test facilities after a survey, under the pretext of localization of nuclear fuel—1990 April edition of WOLGAN CHOSON.

Meanwhile, the KAERI has developed the KMRR multipurpose research reactor by working with other countries on designing the Yonggwang No. 3 and No. 4 reactors and has acquired basic technology, including a computer code used in manufacturing nuclear warheads, through joint designing work on a multipurpose research reactor—1990 April edition of WOLGAN CHOSON.

South Koreans engaged in nuclear development openly say that they have built a large, elaborate technological substructure which makes them regard manufacturing of atomic bombs as insignificant—1990 April edition of WOLGAN CHOSON.

B. The atomic reactors at issue:

The number and capabilities of atomic reactors are an important indicator of nuclear development potential.

Three research reactors, eight light-water reactors, and one heavy-water reactor in operation in South Korea are being used for military nuclear development, according to the authorities' nuclear arms development policy.

The nuclear development research reactors at issue are the 2,000 kw-class (Triga) Mark No.3, which began operation in 1972, and the 30,000 kw-class multipurpose research reactors, which began operation in 1992.

The 1990 April edition of South Korean magazine WOLGAN CHOSON wrote that all of the research reactors can be used to produce plutonium for nuclear bombs. In particular, the atomic reactor considered the most serious is the Wolsong (Cando)-type heavy-water

reactor. The motive behind building it, its purpose, and its operation are all directly connected with nuclear development.

The relevant figures in South Korean nuclear development confessed that introduction of the (Cando)-type heavy-water reactor from Canada was clearly related to nuclear development and that they attempted to develop heavy-water type nuclear weapons—1989 April edition of SINDONG-A and 1991 March edition of WOLGAN CHOSON.

In the medium and long-range plan for research and development of atomic energy, which was finalized last February, the South Korean Ministry of Science and Technology decided to build a 150,000 kw-class (?new-type) fast breeder reactor by 2011. The ministry started this work in July 1992—29 July 1992, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japan). Social circles in South Korea are concerned about the definite possibility that the authorities may take plutonium while it is being transported in order to use it for the fast breeder reactor—14 January 1993, HANGYORE SINMUN.

After nine years of research, South Korea succeeded in developing a nuclear fusion test device—28 May 1992, HANGYORE SINMUN. Considering that nuclear fusion is used only for manufacturing hydrogen bombs, South Korea's true intention in desperately developing a nuclear fusion device is to develop hydrogen bombs instead of using it for electric energy production.

C. Acquisition of nuclear explosive materials through many channels.

The South Korean authorities have accumulated a considerable amount of nuclear-(?related) materials for nuclear bombs, either extracting it themselves or obtaining it from a third country, and have revealed their undisguised attempt at high-enrichment and reprocessing of these materials in order to secure large amounts of them for industrial use. After tests, South Korea has perfected a system to extract nuclear explosive materials and is now secretly extracting them.

The heavy-water reactor in Wolsong is used as an important production base for military-use plutonium. (Yi Chang-kon), a technological adviser to the nuclear fuel corporation, stated that a double accounting system like the kind corporations have is applied to nuclear fuel after it is used. One may record that 10 kilograms was processed each day, even though 1,000 kilograms of nuclear fuel may have been processed—1992 April edition of WOLGAN CHOSON.

Furthermore, a few years ago the lens of a surveillance camera installed by the IAEA in the No. 1 unit in Wolsong was found covered by a rag. Investigators demanded an explanation for this—1990 April edition of WOLGAN CHOSON.

The [word indistinct] test facility established at the Institute of Atomic Energy Research in Taedok is dangerous for two reasons. One is that this is the only place in South Korea where there is nuclear fuel emission

outside of the atomic power plant after it is used. The second is that this facility can be applied to reprocessing.—1991 October edition of WOLGAN CHOSON.

Since the Pak Chong-hui regime, the South Korean authorities carried out heated operations to smuggle nuclear [word indistinct] material through the international black market. An official concerned in nuclear development mentioned that there was a proposal through a mediator from a foreign country to purchase plutonium.—1992 April edition of WOLGAN CHOSON. Therefore, South Korea has now secured a large amount of nuclear explosive material.

According to Volume No. 5 of SOLIDARITY AND PROGRESS, issued by the National Alliance for Democracy and National Reunification, there are over 20 countries including the ROK [hanguk] and Israel possessing enriched uranium and plutonium—basic ingredients of nuclear weapons. South Korea is not disposing of nuclear fuel after its use. It is being accumulated. As of 1992, 230 [word indistinct] of plutonium contained here is estimated at 10 tons, and it is expected to increase to about 24 tons in the year 2000.—(Peter Haize), "Nuclear Development in South Korea."

The atomic energy circle in South Korea says openly that a plant to reprocess nuclear fuel after its use must be constructed. The Institute of Energy Affairs, an affiliate of Aju University in South Korea, wrote a 3,500-page report in December 1989 entitled "Study on Prospects of Atomic Energy in the Years 2000 and on Establishing Ways To Deal With This Matter." The basic purpose of this report is to carry out diplomatic policy in atomic energy cooperation. It claims that emphasis must be put on creating conditions for core technology of atomic power plants and technology for enrichment and reprocessing, and on the transfer and self-development of the core technology of atomic power plant.

In fact, South Korea concluded a joint reprocessing agreement with Great Britain. In accordance with that agreement, a special office was opened in Seoul. It was agreed that the waste from South Korea's atomic reactors are to be reprocessed at Great Britain's (Sipind) reprocessing plant so that it can be supplied with plutonium.—1992 December edition of (SEKAI).

In his thesis "Nuclear Development in South Korea," (Peter Haize) revealed that mox—a mixed oxide of enriched uranium and plutonium—can be changed for the use of manufacturing nuclear bomb by going through a simple process. First of all mox—m, o, x—fuel can be easily transformed into plutonium without special technology, complicated facilities, or a large investment. It is transformed by slicing it into small pieces and [word indistinct] dissolving it into acetic acid. Second, this type is difficult to do on a large scale [word indistinct] but it is easily possible on a small scale [word indistinct].—1992 December edition of (SEKAI).

South Korea invested a large amount of capital in developing laser enriched technology, thus developing a

copper steam laser used for separating enriched uranium.—1992 edition of Yonam Yearbook. This shows that the production of nuclear materials in South Korea has firmly reached the industrial stage.

D. Secret dispersion, manufacturing of nuclear bombs.

Nuclear bombs are being secretly dispersed after being manufactured in South Korea. South Korea is smuggling in from European countries special bomb-proof explosives that are important elements in manufacturing nuclear bombs and is using them. In this regard, Yi Chang-kon, an expert on nuclear development, admitted that sufficient special explosives can be purchased in international markets.—1992 April edition of WOLGAN CHOSON. It was confirmed that the Korea Explosives Company was secretly producing this kind of special explosives.

Tests for nuclear development were already carried out during the Pak regime in South Korea. A reporter for South Korea's magazine WOLGAN CHOSON testified that it imported a high-speed photographic camera that can take a picture in 1:100,000 of a second and carried out bomb-proof tests through the method of quickly taking pictures. He also testified that the bomb-proof tests using this camera were done in an underground laboratory.—1992 April edition of WOLGAN CHOSON.

Yi Chang-kon hinted that South Korea bought this high-speed photographic camera as spare parts that would later be assembled so that it would not be caught by the surveillance network, even though the camera can be purchased from Japan. Therefore, South Korea is importing the camera used for bomb-proof testing as spare parts and is continuing bomb-proof tests. [filing to be resumed at 2300 GMT 30 January]

Various types of nuclear warheads are being designed and developed in South Korea. Concerning one type of warhead, a certain Choe who is involved in nuclear development said in an interview with WOLGAN CHOSON: One should pay attention to the diameter of missiles. The diameter of the smallest nuclear warhead that can be manufactured in an underdeveloped country in terms of nuclear technology is 80 centimeters. This can be reduced to be put into a 155-mm gun by an advanced country. We attempted to make an 80 centimeter warhead—1991 March edition of WOLGAN CHOSON.

Parts and materials pertaining to manufacturing nuclear warheads are being produced secretly and separately in disguise of common goods and as commodities with special marks by Korea Heavy Industry Corporation, Changwon Machine, Korea Dynamites, Korea Nuclear Fuel Corporation, Nuclear Fuel [word indistinct] Processing Plant, Korea Atomic Energy Technology Corporation, and other enterprises. South Korean nuclear specialists note that in the event that an extreme situation occurs, elementary nuclear weapons can be developed within a nine-month period—1993 14 January HANGYORE SINMUN. This actually means the same

as the nuclear warheads being stored separately in store-houses in the nuclear states.

E. Possession of various nuclear-delivery means.

South Korea possesses various nuclear delivery means, including field guns, missiles and nuclear-loaded airplanes.

The South Korean Army has about 40 155-mm artillery battalions capable of firing nuclear warheads and a 203-mm and eight-inch field gun artillery (?brigade)—1990 June MONTHLY MILITARY VISION.

The 1988 report on the military expenditures of world nations and on weapons transfer published by the U.S. Arms Reduction Bureau—7 August 1989:

The 1988 report on military expenditure of world nations and on weapons transfer revealed that South Korea developed a ROK-type ground-to-ground missile with a maximum range of 256 kilometers, and the 1989 July edition of MONTHLY MILITARY VISION wrote that South Korea developed a medium and long-range guided missile, (Hyonmi), and deployed it in case of war.

Besides, Honest John ground-to-ground missiles and Nike (Hawkras) ground-to-air missiles which the South Korean Army received from the U.S. forces are capable of loading nuclear warheads—1989 June MONTHLY MILITARY VISION.

Four hundred fifty-seven fighters possessed by the South Korean Army—1998 National Defense White Paper:

Of 457 fighters, F-4s and F-16s are capable of loading nuclear warheads—1991 March MAL.

F. Moves Under Real Nuclear (?War)

Nuclear weapons include, in addition to nuclear warheads and nuclear-delivery means, a C-3 I-system which is a system for nuclear battlefield command, for control of communications, and for intelligence.

The South Korean military authorities invested an enormous amount of funds in and deployed a large-scale research group and many business groups for the development of this C-3 I-system.

The (Peking) Project was aimed at gaining perfect capabilities for this system by 1992 so that the automatic command and control system for nuclear battlefield could be established. This is a large-scale plan designed to prepare for a wartime situation—1990 February MAL.

In an article headlined, "The Reality and Operation of (Peking)," the 1989 June edition of MILITARY VISION wrote that the formation of the ROK-type C-3 I-system was launched in full scale from January 1988 at the request of the Sixth Bureau of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the National Defense Research Institute as the main axis. This magazine revealed that large-scale funds will be invested in this project, and Ssangyong Computer, Gold-Star Systems Research Institute, Samsung Semiconductor Communications, Hyundai Electronics, and many other South Korean business groups participated in this project.

The South Korean Army is carrying out a regular nuclear-bomb dropping exercise, being included in the South Korea-U.S. Armed Forces joint operation system.

The 1989 August edition of WOLGAN CHOSON wrote that key general officers of the South Korean Army regularly received briefings, at least once annually, on nuclear strategy and participated in discussions according to the Nuclear appendix in the operational plan of U.S. Forces in South Korea. THE CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, in its 1976 January 1 edition, reported that more than 30 artillery units under the command of the commanding general of the First ROK-U.S. Corps received training on the use of strategic warheads on eight-inch and 155-mm howitzers.

Even South Korean politicians admit that it is widely known that the Team Spirit joint military exercise, which has been held in South Korea each year on a large scale, is a comprehensive military exercise which simulates a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula—1989 January MONTHLY MILITARY VISION.

This illustrates that together with nuclear development, nuclear armament is being frenziedly pushed ahead at a grave stage in South Korea.

As a result, even the United States listed South Korea as a second-category nuclear competition nation—1989 November MONTHLY MILITARY VISION.

3. The Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is a Consistent Position of the Government of the Republic.

The denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is not only a unanimous aspiration and demand of our people and the peaceloving people of the world, but also a consistent stance of the government of the Republic. The government of our Republic repeatedly clarified that it has neither the intention nor the capability to develop nuclear weapons, and officially declared that it will not produce, introduce, or possess nuclear weapons.

Our clean-handedness on nuclear development has been practically proved and objectively verified.

Chong Kun-mo, former South Korean minister of science and technology who is the first South Korean ambassador for nuclear energy cooperation and whose post was newly established by the No Tae-u regime in a bid to speak for the authorities' position on the issue of the North's nuclear development suspicions, said that the intelligence that North Korea has reprocessing technology is doubtful. He assessed that the allegations on North Korea's nuclear development are a political issue, apart from technology—23 June 1990 HANGYORE SINMUN.

In a December 1990 interview with a reporter of the Japanese magazine (SAPIYO), (Larko,) a former U.S. Navy rear admiral, said: As the result of my experience in visiting and inspecting a broad range of industrial facilities both in the North and the South, I do not believe that North Korea has the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, although its subway is the best in the world. Those who claim that North Korea has nuclear weapons seek to give a

sense of horror to Japanese and South Korean people proceeding from a certain purpose.

(Sakurai Kiyoshi), an authoritative Japanese technological commentator, and Dr. (Kenneth Hunt), deputy director of Britain's International Strategic Research Institute, assuredly said that there is no proof that North Korea possesses nuclear reprocessing facilities—1990 July and 1991 March MAL.

This notwithstanding, the United States and the South Korean authorities persistently talked about the North's nuclear development. This is nothing but falsehood and smear with intense political aims to slander North Korea—1992 April WOLGAN CHOSON.

Concerning the insidious purposes of the United States and the South Korean authorities, public opinion at home and abroad pointed out: The nuclear row kicked off by the United States is aimed at making the North powerless and at opening the North by bringing it into the U.S.-led global order. It is also designed to indefinitely postpone the second-stage reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea on the pretext of nuclear weapons. South Korea is acting as shock troops for this because it wants to justify its allegation that South Korea should also possess nuclear weapons—1992 May SOLIDARITY AND ADVANCE, 1992 6 January JOINT RESEARCH published by Hanminjok Research Institute, and 1992 April WOLGAN CHOSON.

In order to achieve such aims, the United States and the South Korean authorities kicked off a row by raising the issue of international nuclear inspection of atomic reactor facilities in Yongbyon, North Korea. Today after the inspection was carried out, they talk about the limited nature of the IAEA's Nuclear Safeguards Accord and inspections. They insist that even our ordinary military facilities must be included in mutual nuclear inspections, thus categorically expanding the nuclear inspection issue.

On the pretext of fictitious nuclear development in the North, the South Korean authorities are attempting to justify the development of their nuclear weapons, which has already entered into a grave stage and is advancing along the road of undisguised nuclear armament. Such a nuclear armament movement by the South Korean authorities is imposing a grave threat to peace in Korea and Asia.

Therefore, for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and for peace in Asia, the criminal maneuvers of the United States and the South Korean authorities to make South Korea a nuclear arsenal on the pretext of our fictitious nuclear development should be checked and U.S. nuclear weapons should be completely withdrawn from South Korea. The South Korean authorities' nuclear development and nuclear armament maneuvers should be immediately suspended.

Because the truth behind South Korea's nuclear armament maneuvers is fully exposed to the world, public opinion at home and abroad should pay due attention to this grave situation, instead of looking at it idly.

The DPRK Government hopes that peaceloving governments in every nation of the world and international social circles will heighten vigilance against nuclear development and nuclear armament maneuvers waged in South Korea, will carry out joint international acts to check and frustrate such maneuvers, and will express firm solidarity to our people's struggle for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

29 January 1993

Pyongyang

IAEA Inspections May End Due to 'Team Spirit'

LD2901183893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1822 GMT 29 Jan 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Aleksandr Valiyev]

[Text] Moscow January 29 TASS—North Korea warned on Friday that the joint U.S.-South Korean "Team Spirit" military exercise scheduled for March may force it to close its objects for IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspections and that its military experts will not observe the manoeuvres despite South Korean invitation.

North Korean Ambassador in Russia Son Song-pil told a press conference that the exercise aggravates the situation on the Korean peninsula and in North-Eastern Asia and disrupts negotiations between both Koreas. He called on Russia and China to refrain from any kind of participation in the manoeuvres and use all efforts to stop them.

According to the North Korean leadership, the "Team Spirit" contradicts the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty because a mighty nuclear power—the United States—participates in it and threatens non-nuclear North Korea, the ambassador said.

He warned that the emerging situation does not allow North Korea "to normally fulfil its commitments" of the treaty, which actually means that North Korean nuclear objects would be closed for IAEA inspectors.

There were four such inspections last year and despite their results the United States and South Korea continue to suspect North Korea of secret nuclear research and this serves as a pretext for resuming the exercise, according to the ambassador.

North Korean military observers will not accept the South Korean invitation to the exercise. As far as the presence of Russian and Chinese observers is concerned, the ambassador said that this is an internal affair of each of the states.

"North Korea would like that the two countries should be in no way engaged in the "Team Spirit" and, realising the negative influence of the manoeuvres on the situation in Asia, take all efforts to completely end the exercise", Son Song-pil said.

POLAND

Involvement in Illegal Sales of Uranium Denied

LD2501190293 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1600 GMT 25 Jan 93

[No video available]

[Text] There are eight tonnes of fissionable elements in Poland—uranium, plutonium, and thorium. If the uranium were to be enriched there would be enough for the production of 10 nuclear charges.

The elements are under strict monthly control—also by the International Atomic Agency. Every movement of every gram is very carefully noted. Of all the elements that show up in illegal sales none are ours.

Former Officials Trading in Plutonium, Nuclear Warheads

AU2501190393 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 21 Jan 93 p 1

[Report by Jerzy Jachowicz and Katarzyna Kesicka: "Uranium Notebooks"]

[Text] Mariusz Chudzik, press spokesman for the Warsaw prosecutor's office, informed GAZETA on Wednesday [20 January], that on Tuesday [19 January] night, the Warsaw prosecutor's office arrested 52-year-old Kazimierz C. and 47-year-old Waldemar M. Those arrested—Kazimierz C. was a deputy minister of culture from 1986 to 1989 and Waldemar M. was an officer in the former Security Service—are involved in illegal trade in radioactive materials used in the production of nuclear weapons.

The prosecutor's office detained Kazimierz C. on Sunday. Kaliksta P. and Hanna R. were detained on the same day, but were released 48 hours later. Waldemar M. was detained on Monday. The prosecutor's office accuses the two of grossly endangering the lives and safety of other people.

One item of evidence for the charges is a film recording made using a hidden camera by journalists working for the German TV program "Monitor," who posed as arms dealers and filmed at the Warsaw Marriott Hotel on 17 December during a meeting with those under arrest. The recording shows that Kazimierz C. offered radioactive materials and expressed his readiness to obtain warheads for torpedoes.

Kazimierz C. admitted offering to sell uranium and plutonium while making a statement to the Office for the Protection of the State. He said that he was only a middleman, however, and that only the owner of the materials knows where they are hidden—that is what we learned from a source close to the prosecutor's office.

Diaries and notebooks full of telephone numbers of persons involved in business for various Polish firms

were found in the possession of those under arrest. They also contain the names and telephone numbers of people from various former Soviet republics, most probably functionaries of former special services. The names of rare metals and radioactive materials appear among the names.

Twenty citizens of the former USSR have been arrested in Brest and Minsk, and seven Poles have been arrested in Biala Podlaska Voivodship. Biala Podlaska prosecutor Kazimierz Szkodzinski told a PAP journalist yesterday that they are all suspected of stealing uranium 238 isotopes and smuggling them into Poland.

ROMANIA

Decision on Regulation of Arms Imports, Exports

93BA0219A Bucharest MONITORUL OFICIAL in Romanian 9 Nov 92 pp 1-4

[Decision No 594 of the Romanian Government on Regulation of Imports and Exports of Articles and Technologies Subject to Control of Their End Destinations as Well as Regulation of Control of Exports for Purposes of Nonproliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Rockets Bearing Such Weapons]

[Text] The Romanian Government hereby decides:

Section 1. Regulation of Imports and Exports of Items and Technologies Subject to Control of Their End Destinations

Article 1. (1) The items and technologies subject to control of their end destinations are those specified in Annex 1.

(2) The term technology, in the sense of the present decision, means particular information, other than that in the public domain, that is necessary for developing, producing or using a product.

The information can take the form of technical data or technical aid.

Article 2. Regardless of the customs system, import and export of the items and technologies subject to control of their end destinations that are specified in Annex 1 are authorized solely on the basis of a type A import license or a type B export license respectively, which are specified in Annexes 2.A and 2.B.

Article 3. (1) This regulation also applies to foreign trade operations that involve purchases or sales of items or technologies specified in Annex 1 and are performed physically outside of the area under Romanian customs jurisdiction, and also to reshipments in series, transfers, or transshipments in case the end destination is changed.

(2) These operations can be performed solely on the basis of a type-A import license or a type-B export license.

Article 4. The provisions of the present decisions apply to all items and technologies specified in Annex 1 regardless of the country of origin or manufacture and including items and technologies produced in Romania.

Article 5. (1) Items and technologies subject to control of their end destination must be accompanied by a copy of the export license issued by the exporting country.

(2) The items and technologies are to be delivered to the importer alone, in the quantities and according to the specifications in the documents, including the export license. Any change in their destination or use must be previously authorized by the organs that issued the initial documents.

Article 6. (1) Exporters and importers of items and technologies subject to control of their end destinations are required to declare whether they conform to the provisions of Annex 1 and to apply for a type-A import license or a type B-export license respectively.

(2) Moreover the persons specified in Article 10 are required to state expressly in the customs declaration whether the respective goods conform to the provisions of the present decision.

(3) If the customs duty on an import is paid to a customs house inside the area of Romanian customs jurisdiction, the importer is required to present the items and technologies subject to control at the customs house of their destination within the time limit set by the customs organ at the point of crossing the border.

(4) If the customs duty on an export is paid to a customs house inside the area of Romanian customs jurisdiction, the exporter is required to present the documents as well as the items and technologies at the customs house at the border within the time limit set by the customs organ in the interior.

Article 7. (1) Any importer of any item or any technology specified in Annex 1 is required to provide the exporter with an import certificate and a certificate of control of delivery.

(2) By issuing the import certificate or equivalent document the issuing authority agrees:

(a) To certify that the importer's declarations are true and to notify the competent organs, according to its laws, in order to penalize false declarations concerning the end use of the items and technologies subject to control;

(b) To oversee the use of the items and technologies subject to control according to their declared destination;

(c) To permit the authority in the exporter's country to make the necessary checks concerning the arrangement and progress of the transaction;

(d) To send the authority in the exporter's country, upon request, a certificate of control of delivery;

(e) To meet any other particular requirements for transfers of items and technologies subject to control, according to the international agreements.

(3) The certificate of control of delivery confirms the arrival of the items and technologies at their destination in the quantities and according to the specifications in the documents and their use for the declared purposes.

(4) The forms for the import certificate [CI] and the certificate of control of delivery [CCL] are specified in Annexes 3.A and 4.A respectively.

Article 8. (1) A copy of the import certificate presented by the applicant will be sent through diplomatic channels by the issuing authority to the competent authority in the exporter's country.

(2) Type A and type B licenses will not be issued unless the import certificate and said copy are identical.

Article 9. The data and information on any of the elements concerning the operations specified in Articles 2 and 3 that are provided by the importers or exporters of the items and technologies specified in Annex 1 will be certified by those authorized to undertake legal responsibility for them, and they are responsible for the truth and accuracy of the respective documents.

Article 10. (1) The provisions of the present decision apply to all persons performing the activities specified in Articles 2 and 3.

(2) "Person" means any individual or juristic person, including government institutions, whether they are in Romania or abroad.

Article 11. (1) Type-A and type-B licenses are issued individually by the Ministry of Trade and Tourism.

(2) The application for a license must necessarily include, in addition to the tariff entry, the number of the item and the corresponding paragraph on the lists specified in the annexes to the present decision.

(3) Type-A and Type-B licenses are valid for six months. If it is necessary to extend their validity, the documents mentioned in the present decision must be countersigned and reconfirmed.

(4) The licenses can be used only by the persons entered under the headings of supplier, sender, seller, exporter, and user, addressee, purchaser and importer.

(5) The licenses cannot be transferred even in cases of merger, division or other ways of reorganizing juristic persons.

(6) The persons specified in Article 10 are required to notify the Ministry of Trade and Tourism immediately of any changes or differences found in the documents or upon delivery and reception of the respective items and technologies. If such changes change the terms on which the respective license was issued, the declaration of those

changes can be regarded as a new application for a license and the license can be revoked accordingly.

Article 12. The following documents will be used for countries that have regulations similar to those in the present decision:

(a) The CI [import certificate] is the document permitting control of the end destination. In order to obtain a CI document, the importer will fill out an application in conformity with Annex 3B.

(b) The CCL [certificate of control of delivery] is the document permitting subsequent control of the end destination. In order to obtain a CCL document, the importer will fill out an application in conformity with Annex 4B.

(c) If the partner countries issue documents with equivalent contents they can be used.

Article 13. (1) The following rules will be observed in relations with partners in countries that have similar regulations:

(a) For exports:

—The exporter is required to ask his partner for a CI document or an equivalent issued by the competent authorities in the importing country. Said document must be attached to the application for a type-B license along with the approval of the competent authority.

—After the goods have been delivered but no later than three months from that time the exporter must obtain from his partner the CCL document or any other equivalent instrument certifying that the goods reached their destination. The exporter is required to present this document to the authorities who issued the type-B license within 120 days of the date the goods were exported.

(b) For imports:

—The importer is required to provide his partner with the CI and CCL documents, as well as a copy of the customs import declaration, upon his partner's request.

—Fulfillment of these obligations does not exempt the importer from observing the other legal provisions mentioned in the present decision.

(2) If the importer's partner requests further proof that the goods were imported in addition to the copy of the customs import declaration, the General Directorate of Customs will issue such a confirmation certifying that the goods crossed the Romanian border and entered the area of its customs jurisdiction.

Article 14. (1) For countries that do not have regulations similar to those in the present decision, the following documents will be used and the following rules will be observed:

(a) For exports, issue of a type-B license will depend upon presentation of a certification by the end user, addressee, importer and purchaser whereby they promise to use the product in their country alone and for the declared purpose and to send a certificate to this effect to the supplier, sender, exporter and seller. Said certification will be in writing and signed by those authorized to assume legal responsibility for the end user, addressee, importer and purchaser and also by those competent to certify the truth and accuracy of the respective documents, and the assumed commitment must be clearly stated in the text.

(b) For imports, issue of a type-A license does not depend upon any additional document other than the import certificate.

(2) These rules apply to the operations specified in Articles 2 and 3.

Article 15. (1) Control of the end destination of the items and technologies in Annex 1 requires the persons who are performing the activities specified in Articles 2 and 3 to see that the goods reach their destination and also to provide the documents specified in the present decision.

(2) The end users are also required to provide the documents specified in (1).

Article 16. The addresses and telephone, fax and telex numbers of individuals or legal persons will be entered on all documents specified in the present decision alongside their names or designations.

Article 17. Issue of licenses to import and export military products also requires previous approval, according to the provisions of Government Decision No. 547 of 11 December 1992 on Regulation of Imports and Exports of Special Products.

Section II. Regulation of Control of Exports for Purposes of Nonproliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons and of Rockets Bearing Such Weapons

Article 18. (1) The technologies, materials, substances, equipment, installations and their components subject to control are those specified in Annexes 5-8.

(2) The items and technologies specified in (1) are imported and exported according to the provisions in Section I, which apply accordingly, and also according to the particular requirements in Annexes 5-8.

Article 19. Issue of import and export licenses for nuclear products also requires previous approval, according to the provisions of Law No 61 of 1974.

Section III. National Agency for Control of Exports

Article 20. (1) The National Agency for Control of Exports, henceforth called "the Agency," is formed to carry out the provisions of the present decision. It is a specialized organ under the government, with juristic

personality and its own budget, headed by a director general, and with the organizational structure specified in Annex 9.

(2) The Agency is coordinated by an interministerial council composed of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Trade and Tourism, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Communications and Ministry of Justice, on the level of a secretary or under-secretary of state.

(3) The Interministerial Council examines and approves import and export applications concerning the items and technologies specified in the present decision in conformity with the international obligations assumed by Romania and with its economic interests and those of national security, while also considering the activities of the end users, the credibility of the applicants, and other considerations concerning the efficiency of the system instituted by the present decision.

Article 21. In order to perform its functions the Agency forms its own control corps composed of the Agency's specialists and other experts as well, who are consulted when needed, while the Agency bears the expenses of exercising control.

Article 22. The Agency has the following functions:

(a) It checks the truth and accuracy of the declarations of the persons performing the operations specified in Articles 2 and 3.

(b) When necessary it checks in-house or on the spot points bearing on the arrangement, progress or completion of export or import transactions that involve the items and technologies subject to control.

(c) It cooperates with the comparable authorities in partner states in conformity with the provisions of the present decision.

(d) It analyzes and reviews the import certificate or equivalent documents issued by the competent authorities in importing companies in order to issue type B export licenses.

(e) It issues the import certificate and the certificate of control of delivery for imports addressed to Romanian territory.

(f) It informs the National System of Records and Control of Nuclear Materials concerning the approvals issued.

(g) In cooperation with the Ministry of Trade and Tourism and with the General Directorate of Customs, it periodically informs the Romanian government of trade operations to which the present decision applies.

(h) It approves prohibiting the arrangement or stopping the progress of the operations in Articles 2 and 3 in case of violation of the provisions of the present decision.

(i) Jointly with the competent institutions, it initiates updating the annexes to the present decision in conformity with the international commitments assumed by Romania.

Article 23. International cooperation on the subject has the following main objectives:

(a) Consultations and mutual information in the case of applications for a license if there are cogent indications of their possible use for purposes other than the declared ones;

(b) Updating and uniform application of the regulations on the subject, including the lists of items and technologies subject to control;

(c) Reporting violations of the control system for the competent organs to penalize them.

Article 24. (1) With the support of the competent ministries, the Agency organizes an extensive program to inform the other institutions cooperating in the enforcement of the present decision, as well as the economic agents, about the objectives, principles, standards and procedures in connection with regulation of imports and exports of items and technologies subject to control of their end destinations as well as regulation of control of exports for purposes of nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and of rockets bearing such weapons.

(2) The Agency and, as the case may be, the competent ministries grant specialized consultations upon requests of economic agents interested in performing the operations specified in Articles 2 and 3 and involving the items and technologies subject to control.

Section IV. Penalties and Other Provisions

Article 25. (1) Violations of the provisions of the present decision concerning import or export operations as well as those concerning the truthfulness of the declarations, which are offenses under the law, are penalized according to the provisions of the Penal Code.

(2) If the acts are not considered offenses under the law, violations of the provisions of Article 6.3 and 6.4 of Article 11.2, 11.4, 11.5, and 11.6, of Article 13.1, and of Articles 15 and 16 are infractions and are penalized by a fine of 2-5 times the value of the transaction.

(3) Infractions are determined and fines are levied by employees of the Agency and the customs organs, who are specially authorized by the heads of those institutions.

(4) The provisions of Law No. 32 of 1968 on Establishing and Penalizing infractions are also applicable to the infractions specified in this article.

Article 26. (1) The General Directorate of Customs checks the truth and accuracy of the data and information entered on the documents necessary for performing the operations specified in Articles 2 and 3. Moreover the General Directorate of Customs, jointly with the other competent institutions as the case may be:

(a) Anticipates, determines, investigates and penalizes activities in violation of the present decision;

(b) Stops and inspects vehicles and goods in transit, checks grounds, buildings, property and storehouses and takes samples for identification, inspects and photocopies records and correspondence, and asks any organ or person to present documentation and information concerning trade and items and technologies subject to control;

(c) Overseas observance of the terms for loading, transporting, unloading, installing and storing items and technologies subject to control;

(d) Obtains the cooperation and help of persons engaged in selling, distributing or transporting items and technologies subject to control, for purposes of enforcing the present decision.

(2) Whenever necessary and in conformity with the treaties, accords or other commitments to which Romania is a party, the procedure for issuing licenses and enforcing the provisions of the present decisions can involve competent official persons in an exporting country alongside the official persons in Romania. This cooperation will include procedures for checking the previous granting of licenses and the subsequent delivery as well as general collaboration in the area of enforcing the regulations concerning control of exports.

(3) In the case of exports, persons who act as sellers are required to enter their right of control, direct or through the Agency, over the end destination of the goods as part of the concluded contracts.

Article 27. (1) For the export or import operations specified in Articles 2 and 3 that are in progress on the date the present decision takes effect and involve items and technologies subject to control, the license or reconfirmation of the license will be requested in conformity with the provisions of the present decision within no more than 30 days from the date the present decision takes effect.

(2) If the request is not made within that time, the previously issued license is legally void and the operations in progress are suspended until another license is obtained.

(3) If the license is not reconfirmed or a license is not obtained within 45 days from the date the present decision takes effect as the case may be, the operations in progress are suspended until a license is obtained.

Article 28. (1) Annexes 1-9¹ are integral parts of the present decision.

(2) The present decision takes effect 15 days from the date it is published in MONITORUL OFICIAL AL ROMANIEI.

(3) Any provision to the contrary is hereby abrogated.

Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan.

Countersigned by Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Nastase, Minister of Trade and Tourism Constantin Fota, Minister of National Defense Major General Nicolae Spiroiu, Minister of Economy and Finance George Danielescu, Minister of Industry Dan Constantinescu, Minister of Environment Marcian Bleahu, Minister of Interior Victor Babiuc, Minister of Communications Andrei Chirica and Minister of Justice Mircea Ionescu-Quintus

Bucharest 28 September 1992

No. 594

¹Annexes 1-9 are published in a pamphlet available from the Ministry of Trade and Tourism.

ARGENTINA

Foreign Minister on Weapons Control

PY1601022793 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish
2233 GMT 14 Jan 93

[Excerpts] Salta, 14 Jan (TELAM)—Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella has stated that "the general guidelines of Mr. (Bill) Clinton's policy with regard to Latin America in general and to Argentina in particular will remain very much the same as they are now. This stems from the conversation President (Carlos Saul) Menem had with the U.S. president-elect." [passage omitted]

In a statement to the press in Paris, Di Tella pointed out the efforts made by Argentina and other countries in the region in order that Latin America might be a zone free from weapons of mass destruction.

Di Tella took part in the ceremony at UNESCO headquarters in Paris marking the signing of the treaty banning chemical weapons.

He said that "the struggle against weapons of mass destruction is essential to attaining international peace and security." He then referred to the agreements Argentina had signed within the framework of its nonproliferation policy.

Among them Di Tella mentioned the "Mendoza Commitments" signed by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in 1991 on the banning of chemical and biological weapons. Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay later adhered to this treaty.

He then spoke about the Tlatelolco Treaty signed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico so that Latin America might soon become a nuclear-free zone. If there is political will and the courage of one's convictions to make the necessary decisions, it is possible to draft effective agreements to check the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." [no beginning quotation marks as received]

Di Tella flatly rejected the concept of chemical weapons as "the bomb of the poor," a phrase he termed "revolting." In conclusion he stated that the treaty "is a step forward in the quest for stability."

100,000 Curies of Cobalt 60 Shipped to Colombia

PY2801205293 Buenos Aires BUENOS AIRES
HERALD in English 28 Jan 93 p 5

[From the "Business World" column]

[Text] Argentina exported 100,000 curies of Cobalt 60 to Colombia this week, a communique from the National Atomic Energy Commission reported yesterday. The shipment, made in sealed containers and worth 130,000 dollars represents the first time this product has been exported to Colombia, where it will be used for industrial irradiation. Cobalt 60 is produced by the nuclear

power station of Embalse Rio III and has been exported since 1986. Annual exports of Cobalt 60 come to some 1.7 million dollars.

CUBA

Reports on Signing of CW Convention in Paris

Foreign Minister's Speech

FL1501030293 Havana Radio Rebelde Network
in Spanish 0000 GMT 15 Jan 93

["Full text" of speech by Cuban Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon de Quesada on the occasion of the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Paris; date not given—read by announcer]

[Text] The complete and effective outlawing of chemical weapons is the positive result of a long and complex negotiating process in which all our nations participated. It is a real disarmament measure, which eliminates a particular kind of weapon. Now we must make sure the agreement is strictly adhered to. Upon signing it, I must make reference to the particular situation of my country, a part of whose territory continues to be illegally occupied by a U.S. military base. The base is usurping Guantanamo Bay. The U.S. Government will be obliged to exclude chemical weapons completely from that base. We hope that the said government and the rest of the signers will comply fully with this agreement.

We cannot be content with this achievement, obtained after several decades of negotiations, however. Chemical weapons are not the only weapons of mass destruction. There are more than enough reasons to demand a complete ban on nuclear weapons and all other means of mass destruction. It is unacceptable for only one type of weapons to be eliminated, while certain powers devote enormous resources to trying to produce and employ new instruments of annihilation.

Nothing justifies militarism and an arms race today. Nor can anything explain it, except pretensions to hegemony and domination mania. If peace is truly desired, the so-called cold war must not be followed by a new colonial order. In order to prevent this, it is indispensable to guarantee the rights of all nations without exception, and to respect their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

True disarmament is a goal still far off; and yet attaining total disarmament would not suffice to bring about a universal peace. A universal peace requires much more. Hunger and extreme poverty too constitute weapons of mass destruction that kill millions of people in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean; and banning them is a need that must not continue to be ignored. The peoples of the Third World will continue to demand (?that an end be put to these things).

More than speeches, what is needed is a real will to pay heed to that complaint.

Commentary on UN Agreement

*PA1301183393 Havana Radio Havana Cuba in Spanish
0000 GMT 13 Jan 93*

[Commentary by Miguel Cabrera]

[Text] Cuba does not have chemical weapons of mass destruction, and soon it will show its peaceful nature with the signing in Paris of a UN agreement for the elimination of those lethal objects. Reality will contradict the virulent U.S. campaigns on the alleged aggressiveness of the Cuban Government, which has also exhibited a peaceful position regarding agreements on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

Jorge Morales, Cuban ambassador for disarmament matters, recently said Havana is not only willing to sign the international agreement banning the development, production, storage, and use of chemical weapons approved by the United Nations in October, but it has also actively participated in 24 years of negotiations on the subject. He added that Cuban authorities hope the signing of the agreement will make a reality the goal of

totally eliminating by 2007 this type of weapon that not only destroys human life but also has a corollary that affects agriculture and flora and fauna for a long time. Observers in Havana pointed out that the use of chemical weapons by the United States in Vietnam damaged the ecology in that Asian country, and the consequences are still felt today.

The agreement sponsored by the United Nations and approved in October 1992 must be signed by two-thirds of the UN members; that is, 65 countries. It would go into effect in 1995. In the interim, an international institution will be created with main offices in The Hague. That institution will design the mechanisms for control and verification.

It has been estimated that approximately 85,000 of the 100,000 tons of chemical weapons that exist on the planet are stored in the United States and Russia.

Cuba will definitely exert all its influence, as it has been doing so far, to make the objectives of this highly beneficial and encouraging agreement a reality.

Cuban Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon's presence in Paris will attest to the great importance Cuban authorities are placing on that event.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Egyptian Foreign Minister at Geneva Conference

NC2801160593 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1354 GMT
28 Jan 93

[Text] Geneva, 28 Jan (MENA)—Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa asserted that the discussion of the issue of removing weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East should not be postponed until after the establishment of peace in the region, noting that the proliferation of these weapons, especially nuclear ones, is unacceptable under any circumstances.

This came in the statement Musa delivered today before the disarmament conference in Geneva in which he reviewed Egypt's initiatives and steps toward regional disarmament, particularly weapons of mass destruction. The minister referred in his statement to Egypt's efforts in this respect, starting with its 1974 proposal and ending with President Husni Mubarak's 1990 initiative to make the region free from all weapons of mass destruction, which was adopted by all the Arab countries and enjoyed worldwide support and backing.

Musa said: Despite all the Egyptian and Arab steps and initiatives, Israel has so far not acted to tackle the issue of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and to submit its nuclear facilities for international inspection like other countries in the region.

The foreign minister added that the statement delivered by Israeli Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres at the Paris conference for signing the chemical weapons treaty might be a signal of Israel's willingness to tackle the issue of nuclear weapons. He said that the relevant departments in Egypt are now studying the Israeli foreign minister's statement to decide how to deal with it.

Musa reviewed the recent radical changes that have influenced the nature of international relations. He stressed that these changes present the international community with the real challenge of exploiting the changes to create a new world based on equal rights and supremacy of law. He also asserted that security has several aspects, including economic, social, environmental, and political questions, and not just military ones, and that it is from this premise that Egypt has called for setting up a forum for dialogue between the Mediterranean Sea countries.

Musa called for drawing up a new concept for international security based on the common interests of all countries and not on military power. He underlined the need for this new concept to be drawn up on two bases: achieving security at the lowest possible level of armament and equality of all countries in duties and commitments.

The minister also reviewed the various issues before the disarmament conference. He underlined Egypt's stand

on the need to reach a complete ban on nuclear tests and to ensure that all countries join the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

The Geneva disarmament conference is the only UN forum for negotiations in the disarmament sphere and includes 39 countries with military weight, including Egypt, which will take its chairmanship on 1 July.

BANGLADESH

Editorial on Missile Technology Control Regime

BK2501115393 Dhaka DAINIK ITTEFAQ in Bengali
13 Jan 93 p 2

[Editorial: "Checking Proliferation of Missiles"]

[Text] More good news related to arms reduction has been heard after the signing of the widely acclaimed START II treaty by outgoing U.S. President Bush and Russian President Yeltsin. A total of 21 countries including the United States have agreed to further strengthen the policy to check the proliferation of intercontinental missiles. It may be mentioned that such missiles are capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear bombs, to targets far away. Hence, the nonproliferation of intercontinental missiles assumes great significance for those who are championing the cause of disarmament. These missiles can cause large-scale destruction in the world not only by bearing nuclear bombs but also by carrying chemical and biological weapons. In this connection, U.S. State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher has said that the accord reached by 22 countries will further strengthen the existing regulations on intercontinental missiles. It may be recalled that in 1987, a handful of countries reached an informal agreement on the control of intercontinental missiles. This accord is known as the Missile Technology Control Regime—MTCR. In accordance with the provisions of this accord, signatory countries pledged not to transfer material or technology in relation to this missile to any country that does not possess it. The accord was applicable to missiles having a range of 186 miles and capable of launching destructive payloads of over 500 kilograms. According to Boucher, the present accord restricts the transfer of technology for intercontinental missiles of any range. Therefore, from now onward the motive of importers will be the main consideration in the export of missiles or their technology. But nothing has been said about the yardstick that would be applied for judging the motive of importers.

It may be mentioned that though the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and other countries have reached an agreement in this regard, Russia and China however refrained from signing this accord. In addition, several other countries engaged in developing missiles have also disagreed with this arrangement. Russia, which is not an MTCR signatory, is supplying superior quality fuel to India for the launching of rockets

despite U.S. objections. Though New Delhi has pledged that this fuel will be used for a space research program, many have expressed doubts in this regard. This suspicion has been further accentuated by the tests India is conducting with its long-range missile, Agni. Pakistan has followed India by testing its short-range missile, Hatem. Under the pretext of conducting weather research, Pakistan launched a satellite named Badar-1 in 1990. Preparations are going on to launch Badar-2 early next year. Several other countries, including Israel which is not an MTCR signatory, are also engaged in similar activities either openly or secretly.

Observers believe that the accord signed recently by the 22 countries still remains inadequate as Russia and China have yet to sign as well. Efforts made by different countries to acquire missile technology under various pretexts are well-known. It is expected that all countries, big or small, will follow the same policy regarding missiles and nuclear weapons.

CYPRUS

Spokesman Denies Missiles Purchased To Hit Turkey

NC2501173093 Nicosia CYPRUS NEWS AGENCY
in English 1630 GMT 25 Jan 93

[Text] Nicosia, Jan 25 (CNA)—Government Spokesman Andreas Mavrommatis denied Monday Turkish press reports claiming the Greek Cypriot side had purchased French missiles to strike south Turkey's coastline.

Mavrommatis said "anything we have is clearly for defensive purposes. We are certain that Turkey knows that. It can also be assured by other countries which can testify that such a possibility can be ruled out."

He added the report raised questions whether Turkey was "trying to create an advance alibi for future illegal actions."

According to Turkish daily "BUGUN" (Today) [published in Istanbul], the French made missiles could strike the southern cities of Turkey and first of all the port of Mersina in an attempt by the Greek Cypriots to disrupt the sea link-up between Turkey and the occupied areas.

"BUGUN" claimed France received 100 million dollars for these missiles, adding "the Greek Cypriots have spent a total of 1 billion dollars on armaments and the Cypriot National Guard has 40 French AMX tanks."

Cyprus has been divided since the 1974 Turkish invasion. Some 35,000 Turkish troops continue to occupy 37 percent of its territory.

The Cyprus Government has offered to disband the National Guard and demilitarise the island if Turkey agrees to pull out its occupation forces.

INDIA

Threat From Pakistan's Nuclear Activity Viewed

'Myths Demolished'

93WP0067A Madras THE HINDU in English 4 Dec 92
p 1

[Article by K.K. Katyal; quotation marks as published]

[Text] New Delhi, Dec. 3—The sensational disclosures of Pakistan's nuclear activities by the U.S. media—for the second consecutive day—have vindicated the official Indian stand, apart from serving to demolish the myths created by interested sections.

The reports by NBC news—that Pakistan had built seven nuclear bombs and that it was prepared to use the weapon against India in the spring of 1990—are definitive, not speculative and are attributed to unimpeachable sources in the U.S. administration. Noting this, officials here drew attention to the fact that the U.S. sources—which ought to know the real position—have now chosen to say what India had been maintaining all these months.

What was not known here was the manner in which the nuclear ambitions had gotten mixed with domestic politics in Pakistan. This point is brought out in the latest report by the NBC News—that the Pakistani Prime Minister of the day, Ms. Benazir Bhutto, was not told by the Generals of their nuclear plans, that she came to know of it from the U.S. Ambassador in Islamabad and that she was overthrown when she protested.

It was in the spring of 1990—when, according to the NBC News, the Generals toyed seriously with the idea of using the bomb—that the U.S. President, Mr. George Bush, sent Mr. Robert Gates, then Deputy Security Adviser, as his personal envoy to India and Pakistan to counsel moderation to them.

How Washington—Mr. Clinton's Washington—responds to the facts, made public now—could only be a matter of speculation at this stage.

Concern in Parliament

93WP0067B Madras THE HINDU in English 4 Dec 92
p 1

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] New Delhi, Dec. 3—The report that Pakistan has built seven nuclear weapons and had in fact seriously considered using a nuclear weapon against India in 1990 as tension between the two countries built up over Kashmir was referred to in the Rajya Sabha today, with members expressing grave concern over the matter. There were persistent demands that the Government make a statement on this, tell the House about India's

defence preparedness, call an-all-party meeting to discuss the country's nuclear policy and seriously consider the nuclear option.

No sooner was the question hour over, than Mr. J.P. Mathur (BJP) got up to draw the attention of the House to the report. He said the Government should drop its 'wishy-washy' nuclear policy, pointing out that his party had always wanted the country to make the nuclear bomb. He emphasised that reports suggested that Pakistan also had the ability to deliver the bomb "within four hours" and that the United States had helped Pakistan in getting some of the technology.

Appeal to BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party]: Members from various parties—the CPI [Communist Party of India], the CPI(M) [Communist Party of India-Marxist], the Congress and the Janata Dal—dwelt at length on the gravity of the situation. Most of the zero hour was taken up by the issue, and the CPI member, Mr. Chaturanan Mishra, going to the extent of appealing to the BJP to withdraw its 'kar seva' plans in view of the new security threat. "If you are setting our own house on fire, how can we fight the outside forces," he asked.

Mr. Inder Gujral (Janata Dal) pleaded forcefully for the Prime Minister's assessment of the country's defence preparedness. "What steps are being taken to bring this to the notice of the high priests of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," he wanted to know. Would the issue be taken up for discussion when the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan meet in Dhaka shortly? He also warned that Iran may be on the verge of becoming a nuclear power and that certain confabulations were taking place between West Asian and Central Asian countries.

Casual treatment: There were some sharp comments about the casualness with which the Government seemed to be treating the issue. Members objected to Ministers talking among themselves while the issue was being discussed.

Mrs. Margaret Alva, Minister of State for Personnel, was talking to Mr. Sitaram Kesri, Welfare Minister, while the Health and Family Welfare Minister, Mr. M.L. Fotedar, was busy talking to some Congress members. In fact, soon after this, most of the treasury benches emptied, with the lone exception of Mr. M.M. Jacob, Minister of State for Home.

There were many voices of concern—Mr. G.G. Swell, Mr. Sukumal Sen (CPI-M), Mr. Jaipal Reddy and Mr. O. Azmi (both JD), Mr. Yashwant Sinha (SJP) and Mr. S.S. Ahluwalia and Mr. Abrar Ahmed (both Cong.) Mr. Ahluwalia tried to pacify the House by pointing out that such reports had been appearing every now and then, and that the country was not afraid of any weapons that Pakistan might acquire.

Police Seize 'Suspected' Uranium Package

BK2101164493 Hong Kong AFP in English 0116 GMT 21 Jan 93

[Text] New Delhi, Jan 21 (AFP)—Police have seized some 1,200 grams (2.5 pounds) of alleged uranium from a drug store in the eastern Indian state of Bihar, the Press Trust of India (PTI) reported Thursday.

Superintendent of Police M.K. Jha was quoted as saying that the packet containing the suspected uranium and a pistol were seized Wednesday from the store in Begusarai town.

Police said they were informed about the unclaimed packet by the owner of the drug store, adding that the consignment had been sent to the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Bombay for examination? [punctuation as received]

The packet had "U.S.A." markings, PTI said.

Progress in Nuclear Industry Reported

BK2101155893 Delhi PATRIOT in English 4 Jan 93 p 5

[Text] Bombay, Jan 3 (UNI)—India has made significant strides in various aspects of peaceful applications of nuclear energy in 1992.

According to official sources here, as a result of indigenous capabilities established over the years, the Indian nuclear industry has continued to flourish. Two Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) became operational—one at Narora and the other very recently at Kakrapar. The Kakrapar unit is the first PHWR where thorium bundles have been introduced in the initial fuel change.

In contrast to long gestation periods experienced with earlier nuclear projects in the country, the Kakrapar reactor took just eight years from concreting of raft to criticality. It is hoped that this experience will enable the industry to plan [and] build future reactors in even lesser time.

Indian scientists have sustained their efforts in building the infrastructure for the nuclear power programme, successfully commissioning heavy water plants to meet the requirements in the power sector. Programmes to produce zinc alloy and natural uranium fuels are being augmented and new facilities for mining, exploration, processing and production of zirconium and titanium sponge are being executed.

The sources say that the industry is all set to implement a nuclear power programme (10,000 mw by 2000) which is absolutely essential for a country of India's size and population, particularly in the context of limited resources of other forms of energy.

The three-stage development of the nuclear programme, namely the first stage of PHWRs, the second of fast

breeder reactors for burning plutonium and the third stage of using thorium is firmly on course.

An advanced channel inspections system has been developed and successfully implemented in the PHWR out in service inspection of coolant channels. [sentence as published] Considerable success has also been achieved in using a combination of electromagnetic and mechanical flexing techniques for relocation of garter spring supports in PHWRs.

The nuclear scientists are also working on the decision of an advanced heavy water reactor system whose inherent safety will be derived through in-built neutronic and thermal hydraulic characteristics. The reactor, aimed as a next generation system, will enable extraction of eight major fractions of energy from thorium with minimum consumption of plutonium driver fuel. The design and feasibility study of this system is expected to be completed in a few years time.

Safety and regulatory mechanisms have operated in a congenial atmosphere and the insistence on quality control and inspection of operating systems, especially of the PHWR reactions, have ensured full protection against possible malfunctioning of the systems.

The sources say there is no substitute to an in-house and local peer review system.

The senior scientists are pained that the electronic media sponsored from outside the country have attempted to create confusion by unwarranted highlighting of health problems which have no correlation to the operation of nuclear facilities.

In research and development areas, nuclear facilities continue to provide the country's requirement of radio-isotopes, radiopharmaceuticals, radiographic equipment, nucleonic gauges, and irradiators for a wide range of applications in industry and health care.

Multi-Fuel Nuclear Reactor Development Welcomed

BK2901150793 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES in English 19 Jan 93 p 13

[Editorial: "Nuclear Laurels"]

[Text] The report that the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre [BARC] is designing a multi-fuel nuclear reactor for power generation, which will use plutonium and thorium-uranium fuels, comes on top of its recent achievement in loading thorium fuel for flattening the neutron flux in thermal nuclear reactors. Earlier BARC had also built a spent fuel reprocessing plant to extract plutonium from the used-up fuel bundles in thermal reactors as well as a fast breeder test reactor based on plutonium carbide fuel—technologies which are closely held by only four countries. While each of these achievements is a milestone in acquiring and demonstrating indigenous capabilities, the proposed multi-fuel reactor

would be a unique development, which the BARC director, Dr R. Chidambaram, has claimed as the first in the world because of its versatility in achieving different neutron fluxes in the same reactor and solving related technological and engineering problems. These capabilities are themselves the result of the vision of Dr Homi Bhabha who at BARC built up teams of first rate scientists in several scientific disciplines. The significant achievements of these teams underscore the futility of the efforts made by some nuclear-weapon states to deny India access to certain high-tech items like super computers.

India can therefore go to the next NPT [Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty] review conference as an equal and not as an inferior in nuclear technology. The BARC teams have developed parallel processors with matching computing capabilities which themselves are being upgraded to supercomputing levels. In the background of carping and often justified criticism that several other scientific establishments have not given adequate dividends on the investment in their manpower and equipment, what the Atomic Energy and Space Science establishments have demonstrated is the capability of Indian scientists, technologists and engineers given the right vision and motivation. The major drawback in the pursuit of science is the absence of this vision and mission and diffusing of research funds on a large number of projects, each getting only a subcritical amount. Several top Indian science managers like Dr C.N.R. Rao and Dr S.K. Joshi are justifiably worried over the steep cuts in allotments to science and technology. This situation could be remedied if planners and scientists come together to review research areas and ensure adequate funding of priority projects.

IRAN

Reports Allege Receipt of Nuclear Bomb

Report Termed 'Ridiculous'

LD2701110293 Tehran IRNA in English 0953 GMT 27 Jan 93

[Text] Tehran, Jan. 27, IRNA—A Persian daily Wednesday reiterated that the Zionist regime was the main threat to the region and called on nations to beef up their anti-Zionist campaigns.

The Persian daily, "JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI" was commenting on a report published in a newly-launched German weekly alleging that Iran had received a nuclear bomb and completed test flights with MiG-27 to use the bomb in attacks on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman as well as units of the American forces in the Persian Gulf—something which the paper termed as "ridiculous."

The German weekly "FOCUS" added that the Zionist regime was watching Iran's military movements and had

announced explicitly its intention of destroying all atomic installations and armaments in any Arab state or Iran.

The daily asked in its editorial if Iran was supposed to attack Arab states with its alleged atomic bomb why the Zionist regime was so concerned. All the reports and issues intending to introduce Iran as "the major threat in the region" are led by international Zionism and the Zionist regime, it said.

The Zionists who have smelled the danger from Islamic uprisings throughout the Islamic world and are well aware of Iran's influence on these movements, have no other choice but to counter Iran and question its operations and policies under any possible means. The daily said even if Iran possessed such a bomb how would it be able to destroy six Arab states and, at the same time, make a hell for the American Marines in the Persian Gulf.

Warning that international Zionism feared the growth of Islam in the world and that it would turn to any means to counter Islam, the daily stressed that the real nature of the Zionist regime, the main threat to the region, should be exposed to nations through rational methods. Governments, too, should be discouraged from joining the disgraceful Camp David Treaty and reconciliation with the usurper Zionists.

The daily deplored that the enemies of Islam had been successful in infusing their concerns into Arab and Islamic countries through their hostile policies and that the regimes ruling in Islamic countries had been chasing and massacring Muslims instead of the enemies. It is for this same reason, said the daily, that the region and the world of Islam had no other way but to exterminate the Zionist regime.

German Paper Notes CIS Origin

PM2701153593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 27 Jan 93 First Edition p 7

[Item from roundup of ITAR-TASS, EFIR-DAYDZHEST reports under the "Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow" rubric: "Atom Bomb From CIS"]

[Text] The German weekly FOCUS reports that Iran is in possession of nuclear weapons which are ready for immediate use.

Iran acquired them last year in CIS countries. It mentions an atom bomb which can be dropped from an airplane and a launcher for missiles with nuclear warheads.

Embassy in Moscow Denies TV Report

LD3101164893 Tehran IRNA in English 1555 GMT 31 Jan 93

[Text] Moscow, Jan. 31, IRNA—Iran has refuted the allegation by the Russian TV Friday night (January 29) that it possesses atomic arms.

A statement issued by the Iranian Embassy in Moscow on Saturday dismissed the Russian TV's claim that Iran was among those Third World countries having atomic weapons, and pointed out that Iran has signed the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons.

IRAQ

UN Provided With Names of Foreign Arms Sources

NC2501162093 Paris AFP in English 1546 GMT 25 Jan 93

[Text] Baghdad, Jan 25 (AFP) - Iraq says it has provided the United Nations with 90 percent of the names of foreign suppliers of its nuclear programme, UN nuclear expert Maurizio Zifferero said Monday.

Zifferero, head of an eight-member team of nuclear experts who arrived Monday, said his mission here would focus on confirming that the Iraqis had disclosed the names.

"The Iraqis said that we have already been supplied with 90 percent" of the names," said the Italian expert from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

He added: "They affirmed that there's still 10 percent missing.

"Last time (in December) they volunteered to answer questions. We shall see if they will. We will question them again and again."

Iraq has to reveal the foreign suppliers for its nuclear programme in line with UN Gulf war ceasefire resolutions but so far has refused to identify all of them.

Regime Fails To Give 'Complete List'

NC3101190493 Paris AFP in English 1606 GMT 31 Jan 93

[Text] Manama, Jan 31 (AFP) - Iraq still refuses to provide UN inspectors with a complete list of its nuclear suppliers, the team's leader said Sunday adding that Baghdad could still be hiding equipment to resume its program later.

"The Iraqis did not provide the list of their nuclear suppliers," said Maurizio Zifferero on arrival here from a week's mission to Iraq.

UN nuclear experts tried during their mission to obtain the names of suppliers, in a bid to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction under the terms of the 1991 Gulf war ceasefire.

"They want a (specific) questionnaire," on Iraq's nuclear program, he said.

Zifferero said a statement he made last week that the United Nations had the names of 80 foreign suppliers

had been "misunderstood" by the media, and that it was "an old statement" already made during the last mission in December.

Information given by the Iraqis and collected by the United Nations had allowed the identification of the list of 80, he said.

The Iraqis insisted that the 80 accounted for 90 percent of the total list of foreign suppliers, said Zifferero, an Italian official of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The IAEA sought to obtain the complete list of nuclear suppliers to ensure that Iraq does not conceal elements to help it relaunch its nuclear program, he said.

"It is very possible the Iraqis are still hiding some important equipment or material. In that case, Iraq might start again," he said, underlining the need for long-term controls.

Zifferero leaves Monday for IAEA headquarters in Vienna.

UN Arms Inspector Says Iraq Could Develop Bomb
PM2901151593 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian
27 Jan 93 p 15

[Report by Alberto Stabile on an interview with UN arms inspector Maurizio Zifferero: "Germans and Italians Armed Iraq"]

[Text] Baghdad—He will not give any names. The list of 80 privileged suppliers who helped Iraq build up its nuclear program, so brusquely interrupted by the Gulf war, remains top secret. The Iraqis, who, after a lot of denying and sidestepping, claim to be willing to cooperate, still have the last word on the company names. But he admits that Europe's role, and in particular that of Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, was decisive in forming Saddam's atomic program, and certainly more important than that played by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Maurizio Zifferero, the Italian nuclear chemist whose job it is to unveil all aspects of Iraq's most important military secret, is a gentleman of about 60 who rejects the image of supersleuth. He prefers to talk about his difficult task as though it were a normal occurrence in the quiet life of a scientist. Just a little different, a little more lively than others.

While, on the one hand, the Iraqis have made it known that the committee headed by Zifferero, with that list of 80 companies in its hands, has already shed light on 90 percent of their suppliers, the Italian scientist, for his part, is a lot more cautious. "It is an exaggeration," he said, meeting with us in a room in the Sheraton Hotel allocated to the UN medical team. He explained that among those 80 firms there are 40 whose names were supplied by officials from Baghdad's nuclear board.

Names which, in fact, turned out to be "unimportant," such as those of an air conditioner firm or an electrical cable supplier.

"Of course, there is no reason why a nuclear plant should not have an air conditioner. But we are interested in equipment designed for producing the atomic bomb, such as certain special steels, and the so-called dual-purpose plants, civilian and military, which should only be exported after a check is made on the final destination." It is over these suppliers that the Iraqis have finally promised to cooperate. "We have found," Zifferero explained, "100 tonnes of very special steel, essential for the construction of centrifuges, which in turn are needed to enrich uranium. We immediately told the Iraqis: Prove to us that you really want to cooperate with the United Nations by telling us who supplied these to you. Silence. Then last month, a minister let us know that they would tell us. Let us hope that they keep their word."

[Stabile] In the great Gulf plot, it is difficult to distinguish the truth from distortions. What are your views on the Za'faraniyah factory on the outskirts of Baghdad, which was bombed and destroyed 10 days ago? Is it true, as the Americans claim, that the plant was part of the nuclear process; or are the Iraqis right when they say that it was only an innocent metal section factory?

[Zifferero] They are both right to some degree. That was one of the factories on which the nuclear program relied. Its task was to manufacture mass separators used in the production of enriched uranium. After the war we visited it, and we did indeed establish that the factory had been converted for civilian manufacturing purposes. Obviously there is nothing to prevent its having been readapted for nuclear purposes thereafter. That is why I say that they are both right.

[Stabile] But was its destruction a necessary measure or not?

[Zifferero] It was a radical measure, inspired by military and political criteria which it is not my place, as a technician, to judge. I can say that there was an alternative to destruction, however: namely, keeping a watch on the production and on the factory through constant inspection by us—a solution which we will have to adopt for other sites, because you cannot expect to destroy everything. [Zifferero ends]

The Iraqis, Zifferero recounts, had almost succeeded in creating a bomb of a type similar to the one which exploded at Nagasaki. "Their program was rudimentary, and, at the same time, it was sophisticated." They were moving in two directions: enriched uranium and plutonium. In two or three years' time the bomb would have gone into production, at a rate of one or two a year. The investment was "a few billion dollars: Let us say, more than one and less than 10." It is difficult to say whom to thank for this. The scientist doubts whether there was any "transference" of knowledge from the East. "The way the process was set up was undoubtedly the fruit of

local minds. Indeed, Iraq has some of the finest-quality scientists. But of great importance was the know-how supplied by individual industries at the Iraqi government's request. We are asking our hosts exactly who they were."

[Stabile] But while it is true that such an advanced level of planning cannot be improvised, by the same token you do not lose it overnight. So what might happen in the absurd hypothesis that Iraq gets its atomic bomb off the ground again? How long would it take them to produce it?

[Zifferero] On condition that the embargo is lifted and no more inspections are carried out, if it moves into top gear and is able to rely on unlimited financial resources, in five to seven years, Iraq could have the atomic bomb.

IAEA Says Japanese Tools Used in Nuclear Project
OW3001104393 Tokyo KYODO in English 1027 GMT 30 Jan 93

[Text] Baghdad, Jan. 30 KYODO—International Atomic Energy Agency officials confirmed Saturday [30 January] that precision instruments imported from Japan have been used in Iraq's nuclear weapons development.

Officials participating in the inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities said the Japanese-made tools were indispensable for the production of experimental systems, though not vital for the development of nuclear weapons.

The officials told KYODO NEWS SERVICE the instruments included metal surface grinding tools used to manufacture uranium concentration equipment, measuring devices and high-speed cameras.

They said less than 10 Japanese companies were involved in the affair but declined to identify them or their products.

The officials said the Japanese Government has already been informed of the names of corporations involved.

They said the Iraqi Government has refused to disclose how the instruments were imported from Japan.

The officials said German and British enterprises also provided technological cooperation for the Iraqi nuclear project, some of them exporting necessary equipment to Iraq under false declarations.

The eight-member inspection team is scheduled to leave Iraq on Sunday after completing the initial phase of investigations.

LIBYA

Al-Qadhdhafi Reportedly Building Poison Gas Plant
AU2501145793 Hamburg BILD in German 25 Jan 93 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Al-Qadhdhafi Is Building Poison Gas Factory"]

[Text] Libya's dictator Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi is building a subterranean poison gas factory 65 km south-east of Tripoli near the town of Tarhuna. BILD learned this in diplomatic circles. The complex consists of two tunnels (150 meters long, 70 meters wide). Two Thai firms supplied the equipment. Four years ago, Al-Qadhdhafi's poison gas plant in al-Rabitah, in the construction of which German companies (among others, Imhausen-Chemie) participated burned out.

PAKISTAN

DPRK Delegation Visits, Discusses Nuclear Issues
BK3101151693 Islamabad PTV Television Network in English 1400 GMT 31 Jan 93

[Text] A five member parliamentary delegation from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea called on the Senate chairman, Mr. Wasim Sajjad, in Islamabad today. The delegation is led by the chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of DRPK, Mr. Yang Hyong-sop. During the meeting, Mr. Wasim Sajjad said Pakistan believes in peaceful use of nuclear energy and firmly supports nuclear nonproliferation. He said Pakistan has called for a NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] meeting of South Asian countries, but it feels that the objective of NPT can only be achieved when all countries in South Asia, including India, sign the treaty. The Senate chairman stressed the need for resolving the Kashmir issue peacefully in accordance with UN resolutions. He hoped DPRK would use its influence with India in resolving the issue and ask Delhi to refrain from massive human rights violations in the occupied valley.

Mr. Yang Hyong-sop endorsed the views of the Senate chairman for adopting a regional approach on nuclear nonproliferation and for resolving the Kashmir issue peacefully by granting the right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir. He said there existed a great scope for enlarging areas of cooperation between Pakistan and the DPRK in all fields.

The DPRK delegation also called on the speaker of National Assembly, Mr. Gauhar Ayub Khan. The speaker briefed the delegation on the working of the National Assembly and the role of opposition in parliament. The function of various working groups were also highlighted. Mr. Gauhar Ayub Khan underlined the

need for people-to-people contact with various nations through their parliamentary representatives.

Canada Providing Safety Aid for Nuclear Plant

BK2701130693 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 27 Jan 93 p 5

[Text] Canada has agreed to lend safety assistance for Pakistan's principal nuclear plant at Karachi in order to protect it from accidents and spread of radiation etc.

This in itself is considered significant by the concerned authorities. Ever since 1974 the Canadians had put a complete ban on the inflow of information and did not until very recently allow the Pakistanis any access to any kind of technical literature etc.

Persuasions at different levels, convinced them that Chernobyl-like recurrences needed to be guarded against, however. Not that the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) had any problem, except repeated shutdowns, the need for proper safety in immediate and distant future, could never overlooked.

Luckily, the KANUPP staff, from operators to highest echelons of technical management, had a trouble free existence, ever since the plant was installed with Canadian assistance.

KANUPP is now shut down, scheduled for reopening in the beginning on next month but its 105 megawatt production replenishes the industrial city's power needs. However, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission officials are keen on reviewing the 79 paise per unit sale rate to the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, which charges 95 paise ordinarily, and thus makes profit on KANUPP generation.

Sources here emphasise that Pakistan had enough uranium deposits and Pakistani engineers were now concentrating on acquiring building capacity to fabricate indigenous nuclear power plant, to save the country from foreign blackmail.

The present life of the KANUPP is 30 years. It has already been in service for two decades. That leaves ten more years for it to outlive its utility. However local engineers have developed technology to enhance its life to 10 more years. That means that the KANUPP will continue to function for another 20 years.

Work at Kamra Aeronautical Complex Described

BK2801104193 Islamabad THE PAKISTAN OBSERVER in English 28 Jan 93 p 8

[Text] Islamabad—"Ask us we may be the ones you are looking for collaboration and co-operation." This is the motto of everybody, either officer, engineer or Jawan [soldier] working in the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex [PAC] Kamra, located 75 km from the capital Islamabad. The PAC comprises of Aircraft Manufacturing Factory (AMF), Mirage Rebuild Factory and F-6

Rebuild Factory, playing pivotal roles in making the country's defence impregnable.

The complex was created in 1975 to meet the national requirement of self-reliance in the aeronautical field and since then it has become the indispensable backup tool of the national air defense.

Quality of the PAC products has been applauded even by the original manufacturers of the aircraft. With this confidence the PAC places its facilities at the disposal of friendly countries. The PAC was initially conceived as an aircraft repair workshop project, called P-721 in 1972. It was intended for the rebuild of the Chinese built [as published] for initiating similar actions for the rebuild of the French weapon system, as the Mirages were also fast approaching their overhaul date.

Consequently another project was launched in 1974 by the Defence Production Division, under the code name of P-741 for the setting up of rebuild facilities for the Mirage aircraft and their components plus the Atar 9C engines, which power the Mirages. About a year later, another project P-751 was created to assemble and gradually expand the facilities for the complete manufacture of MFI-17 aircraft of Swedish origin to serve as the basic trainer for the Pakistan Air Force and the Pakistan Army. It was given the Pakistani name "Mushshak". When these projects went into production the P-741 and P-751 came to be known as the Mirage Rebuild Factory (MRF) and the Aircraft Manufacturing Factory (AMF), respectively, while the P-721 was renamed as the F-6 Rebuild Factory.

The conglomeration of these aeronautical factories is given the collective name of Pakistan Aeronautical Complex.

As late as 1989, Kamra Avionics and Radar Factory, Karf, which rebuilds air defence radars and their electric power generators, was added to the PAC. This complex is thus catering for the rebuild requirements of all the Chinese aircraft and their systems, Mirage aircraft and their components.

Atar engines and their accessories, air-defense radars, and their Mushshak aircraft for the defense forces of Pakistan and has the capacity to meet export orders for the supply of the aircraft, its spares as well as its ground-handling and support equipment. [sentence as published]

The F-6 rebuild factories of Pakistan Aeronautical Complex PAC has effected foreign exchange savings through rebuild of aircraft to the tune of Rs [Rupees] 2347 million.

Manufacture of external fuel tanks for F-6 aircraft has yielded savings of nearly Rs 10 million. It is expected that the manufacture of drop tanks for F-7P aircraft will further save Rs 145 million.

Mirage Rebuild Factory MRF: Cost of production at MRF was about one third the cost of overhaul abroad.

This has resulted in savings of about Rs 1686 million for aircraft overhaul and about Rs 838 million on account of engine overhaul. Net savings will increase further on account of aircraft components and engine accessories overhaul were added. Experience on aircraft overhaul had enabled the PAC to undertake aging analysis of oldest batch of aircraft and prepared a technical work package for their 2nd overhaul. This effort saved an amount of Rs 4 million which m/s Dassault had demanded for the study and the work package.

PAF [Pakistan Air Force] was venturing in a number of industrial participation programme with Pratt and Whitney of USA. The process of obtaining manufacturing qualification certificates for some of the parts of F-100 engine. [sentence as published]

Aircraft Manufacturing Factory AMF: 92 aircraft were assembled from Kits from 1975 to 1982 and 127 aircraft were manufactured during 1982-92 time frame. In addition to the basic role of manufacturing aircraft AMF has also repaired 66 aircraft which were damaged during operations or were beyond the repair capability of the bases.

AMF has also started earning foreign exchange by exporting aircraft and spares. AMF has already sold 25 aircraft and some 22,000 spares. The export earnings combined with provisioning of aircraft and spares to defence services have resulted in saving of Rs 447 million.

Said Kamara Avionics and Radar Factory KARF has saved a total of Rs 128.43 million over the past five years by rebuilding the radar systems and power generators.

Nuclear Energy Commission Briefs Media on Technology

BK2801093593 Islamabad *THE NEWS* in English
28 Jan 93 p 5

[Text] Islamabad—The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) organised a one-day seminar on nuclear technology for media representatives at Centre for Nuclear Studies (CNS) Nilore on Wednesday.

Journalist from almost all the national dailies and radio and television attended the seminar. They also visited the library and the research centre Science and Technology (PINSTECH).

Speaking on the occasion, Dr Inam-ur-Rehman, director CNS, delivered a lecture on nuclear technology and its historical evolution. He said that reactors can also be used for producing radio isotopes to purify sea water so that it could be used for drinking purposes in addition to generating electricity.

He said that 300,000 megawatts of electricity is being produced by 429 reactors around the world.

Dr M.N. Qazi from CHASNUPP [Chashma Nuclear Power Plant] in his discourse on Pakistan's nuclear

programme said that the swimming pool type research at PINSTECH, the capacity of which was increased from five to 10 megawatts by Pakistani scientists, is being run on 20 percent enriched uranium, whereas the original one was using 90 percent enriched fuel. He said that addition of more reactors at CHASNUPP in future would make it an economical venture.

Dr Mujtaba Nagvi, director of Nuclear Institute for Agriculture and Biology (NIAB) Faisalabad, highlighted the efforts of PAEC in the fields of agriculture, industry and medicine. He also discussed tracer techniques used in diagnostics. The commission, he said, has nine medical, three agricultural and one biotechnological research centres in various cities of the country. He said that NIAB collected 120 plant species and succeeded in producing green biomass to be cultivated in saline "doabahs" [land tracts] which can be used as fodder, fertiliser or for producing paper and alcohol. Giving another example, he said that cotton varieties produced at NIAB give at least 15 percent extra yield and net addition to national exchequer from these varieties is 2 billion rupees per annum. The total budget of NIAB since its inception amounts to RS [Rupees] 245 million only. He also referred to preservation of fruit for longer periods through irradiation.

Dr Naqvi said that farmer approach agricultural centres directly, but there is no success story regarding industry as PAEC is not a manufacturing organisation.

Dr Shamin Chandhry from PINSTECH gave a lecture on international nuclear politics.

SAUDI ARABIA

Arab Atomic Energy Agency Official on Programs
93AE0176A Jeddah *AL-MADINAH* in Arabic 1 Nov 92
p 6

[Interview with Dr. Mahmud Barakat, director of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency, by Hisham Najib and Yusuf Shakir in Cairo; date not given: "Arab Nations' Peaceful Usage of Nuclear Energy a Necessity; Energy Crisis Will Be 'Conflict' of Next Century"]

[Text] In a special interview, Dr. Mahmud Barakat, director of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency, told *AL-MADINAH* that the Arab nations have not been reluctant to adapt to modern times, especially in the field of peaceful nuclear usage. He pointed out that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Algeria, and Libya all have made great strides with regard to using the atom in fields of medicine, environmental isotopes, industry, and agriculture. He said that Arab development plans would be a denial of the civilized world unless they hasten to use nuclear power to produce electricity and distil water. He indicated that Korea's economic development was accompanied by the construction of four nuclear stations, which helped the Korean economy to reach the plateau of advanced nations.

He made it clear that all nuclear reactors are freely available for sale, but not as easily as before the Gulf war. Dr. Barakat also discussed nuclear waste.

He told AL-MADINAH that there is an organized trade operated by dubious persons to ship chemical and nuclear waste to other countries without prior approval.

He stressed that Israel's nuclear weapons are ineffective, because the effects of their radiation would be general and because Israel and the Arab nations are close together and have common borders.

[AL-MADINAH] What are the limits of nuclear usage in the Arab world? What are the levels of progress in this field?

[Barakat] At the outset, let me emphasize that the Arab nations have not shrunk from entering the modern age, especially in the fields of nuclear energy, which are considered the most difficult fields for scientific application because they basically depend on the use of dangerous materials.

Uses for nuclear energy in the Arab world are concentrated in peaceful fields, with differing levels of usage. There are countries that have not entered these fields and others that have made considerable strides, such as Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Algeria, and Libya, in medicine, environmental isotopes, agriculture, and industry.

The Arab region does not have a nuclear power plant, in the well-known sense, but there are three or four small reactors that are used for research. They are located in Egypt, Algeria, and Iraq. With this exception, the rest of the countries import radioactive isotopes from abroad.

Uranium does not represent a problem on the international level because there are excellent reserves and considerable efforts being made to discover it in commercial quantities. In the Arab world, uranium concentrates have been found in Egypt and Libya. Efforts are still underway to discover uranium in other Arab countries.

If the Arab nations want to protect future generations against energy problems, while safeguarding part of the oil treasure that God gave to the Arab nation, we must enter the field of producing electricity by nuclear energy. The world's future problems are energy and water. Fortunately, atomic energy can solve those two problems simultaneously and at one installation. There are reactors used in two stages: first, to distill salt water and, second, to generate electricity. There are reactors that can do both of these jobs simultaneously.

I emphasize that without these two elements—water and energy—I believe that Arab development plans will be a far cry from the countries of the First World.

[AL-MADINAH] The Chernobyl incident led to a reversal of the use of atomic reactors for energy production. What is your comment on that?

[Barakat] That statement has no basis in fact. In the past year, I went to Britain and found that all of their plants, which are similar to the Chernobyl gas-cooled reactor, were operating very efficiently. They are depended upon to generate electricity for large areas of Britain. I also found that there are plans to build more nuclear plants to generate electricity. Moreover, there are countries that have recently begun to enter this field, such as Korea. It has been transformed from a poor country into a strong economic power. Korea's economic growth was accompanied by the construction of four nuclear plants, which have aided the Korean economy to move up to the level of advanced nations. Now, it has 12 nuclear power plants that are used to generate energy. It has also produced two reactors of purely Korean design.

[AL-MADINAH] What are the types of nuclear reactors and the possibilities of obtaining them from advanced nations?

[Barakat] The two most famous types of reactors are the compressed water reactor and the water boiler. They are both based on the idea of producing steam under high pressure, which operates turbines and, in turn, generators to produce electricity. These reactors were designed in the United States and adapted by Germany and France.

There are gas-cooled reactors, designed by Britain. Russia took this idea and manufactured them locally, but they do not meet international nuclear standards. There is international pressure on Russia to shut down these reactors, but doing that in a hurry would destroy the run-down Russian economy. Russian research is now in full swing to deal with this weakness and gradually substitute new Russian designs. Russia has announced that it will dazzle the whole world with its modern reactor design and will overwhelm European and American technology in this field.

In addition, all reactors are available for sale. But it is not as easy to buy a reactor as it was before the Gulf war. At the present time, the international community wants to be certain that a reactor will be limited to peaceful uses. Therefore, there are strict controls over their sale, as well as over nuclear fuel. Canadian, American, European, and Russian systems are in competition, as well as certain southeast Asian nations that have recently entered into competition, such as India, Pakistan, and Korea. They are all competing to sell their nuclear reactors.

[AL-MADINAH] After the longtime use of atomic energy in all fields, doubts have begun to be raised about ways of disposing of nuclear waste and the attempts by certain nations to dispose of it by burying it in the territory of poor nations. What is your comment on that?

[Barakat] Nuclear waste is a big problem that we must not ignore. However, we should approach it calmly and rationally. At the present time in the Arab nation, we have no huge nuclear reactors that produce environmentally harmful wastes. In Egypt, a center is being built to

deal with light and medium waste produced by the use of nuclear energy in hospitals and factories.

On the world level, it is a serious issue. There are studies being made to dispose of radiation waste by appropriate scientific methods. Research is in full swing in a number of advanced countries, such as Canada, America, and Germany. The most recent involves tunnels at a depth of 1 square km underground, with this waste buried in air-conditioned vaults, because it gives off rays and heat.

There is a way to maintain this waste in a pool of water with special specifications and systems. This waste is examined periodically to make sure that it is secure.

A new theory has emerged with regard to nuclear waste disposal. This theory is based on dealing with the waste by separating valuable materials from it that will be needed later. However, this theory has not found attentive ears among governments of advanced nations because it involves very large problems, such as building nuclear reactors and separating plutonium and uranium for military purposes.

With regard to these advanced nations exploiting poor nations' economic circumstances and burying nuclear waste in their territory, I must point out that it is difficult to ship highly radioactive waste from one country to another because it must be secured in protective cases, which are very large and require huge vessels to transport. Therefore, countries that have these waste materials prefer to dispose of them by special methods on their own territory. As for light and medium waste, it is preferred to bury it very deeply in unpopulated desert areas. I do not approve of exploiting some nations' economic circumstances in order to bury this waste, without concern for the human, animal, and plant life in the burial areas.

There is an organized trade, run by dubious persons, to ship chemical waste materials to other countries without obtaining prior approval. There are many cases of arrests involving the shipment and burial of dangerous chemical waste, but there are no nuclear waste convictions in this regard. It is being done officially. For example, Austria submitted an application to the Egyptian Government to bury part of its nuclear waste on Egyptian territory, but Egypt categorically rejected this application.

[AL-MADINAH] Have nuclear accidents occurred within the Arab nations?

[Barakat] In view of the fact that Arab usage of nuclear energy is limited and, consequently, any accidents that occur would not be serious, but rather, would fall within the bounds of ordinary activities of nuclear uses, we must not be alarmed if some polluted water leaked or radioactive material spilled. On the contrary, we must be capable of discovering it and ready to deal with it.

[AL-MADINAH] What are the plans of the new chief of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency?

[Barakat] On the Arab level, I believe that we still need to introduce nuclear sciences into the life of the Arab citizen and resolve his problems concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy and related technology. This, in turn, would reflect on the growth of Arab economies. To the extent that the nations develop in the nuclear field, so will their economies develop. This is a clear fact internationally. The Arab Atomic Energy Agency was established for this purpose, in accordance with an agreement signed by the Arab kings and heads of state in 1964. It is concerned with activities undertaken by the Arab nations as a community, such as groundwater projects, nuclear energy, and scientific uses in industry, agriculture, and medicine.

Arab Atomic Scientists

[AL-MADINAH] Certain Arab scientists in nuclear fields have been subjected to some attacks. What is your comment on that, and what are the ways to protect our atomic scientists from that?

[Barakat] Hostility against Arab atomic scientists is a barbaric way to resolve political and military problems. It is one of the lowest methods used in international politics. As much as we condemn these tendencies, we have a conviction that they will not cease. It is up to us to ensure the protection of our scientists, particularly because the Arab nations, generally, are pursuing peaceful nuclear usage, whose only purpose is to raise their people's living standards and fulfill legitimate demands.

[AL-MADINAH] Israel still claims it does not have advanced nuclear capabilities or weapons. What is the truth of these claims?

[Barakat] Israel is working secretly on its nuclear projects because they are aimed at producing nuclear weapons. Thirty years after Israel began its nuclear project, it is now clear that it has a nuclear weapon. For their part, the Arab nations are not working in this field, because they are working in full view of the international community and reject aggression.

However, Israel's nuclear weapons are ineffective because their radiation effects are general and the distance between Israel and the surrounding Arab nations is very short. Consequently, any use of these weapons will affect, to some extent, Israel's own population. Therefore, I think it unlikely that Israel would use these nuclear weapons. Israel will use them only for intimidation and terror. Consequently, we must not let some of us push us into erroneous actions, as a result of other erroneous actions!

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

Shaposhnikov: Russia 'Heir' to Soviet Nuclear Potential

OW2501180393 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1716 GMT 25 Jan 93

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov has said, commenting on the positions of the four CIS nuclear states (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine), that Russia was the undisputed heir to the Soviet nuclear potential and that all her demands were justified. Belarus had already virtually handed over this right judicially. Kazakhstan also had agreed in principle with the need to do this without any material compensation from Russia.

As far as Ukraine was concerned, the question of compensation and the specific military units which formed strategic nuclear forces ought to be resolved within a month. Shaposhnikov said that the Russian leadership had already begun to receive signals that Ukraine would adopt the necessary position.

The Supreme Command itself "with understanding relates to the unclear position of the Ukrainian leadership with regard to the state ownership of nuclear weapons situated on the republic's territory." Shaposhnikov considered that "this has been brought about primarily by the fact that a section of the Ukrainian parliament would like to alter Ukraine's non-nuclear status without realizing what huge financial resources would be necessary to maintain the functioning and safety of nuclear weapons."

The marshal expressed the hope that Russia and Ukraine would soon formulate an effective mechanism of control for the safety of nuclear weapons. "The only provisions so far agreed are for the Russian defence ministry together with the CIS Supreme Command to carry out the technical supervision. However, if Russia and Ukraine so wished, I would not object if I did not take part in this process myself," Shaposhnikov said.

Reports on Nuclear Talks Held in Minsk

Shaposhnikov Addresses Briefing

LD2501154593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1450 GMT 25 Jan 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow, 25 Jan—The majority of participants in the Minsk summit of the CIS did not sign the agreement on amendments to the strategic forces agreement. Discussion of this document has been postponed until the next meeting of the Commonwealth heads of state, which is scheduled for 30 April in Yerevan. Until then the problems of strategic forces on the territory of former

Soviet republics will be resolved through bilateral talks. This was stated at a news conference today by Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. At the news conference he reviewed the results of the meetings of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Defense Ministers in Minsk.

Almost 15 documents on military-political issues were adopted in Minsk on 20-22 January. In spite of this seemingly favorable background, the fate of the unsigned agreement and related differences between Ukraine and Russia on strategic nuclear forces dominated the commander in chief's news conference.

According to Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, nuclear weapons must belong to a specific state. Under the Lisbon protocol, Russia became the legal successor to the former USSR for strategic nuclear forces. The Minsk summit showed that the parties disagree on strategic forces, however. But it also indicated that possible contradictions can be eliminated at a bilateral level. Belarus has renounced nuclear power status. Kazakhstan does not lay claim to nuclear weapons either and hopes to get rid of them by the year 2000. Ukraine, on the other hand, regards nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory as its own, rather than Russia's. At the same time, it does not deny Russia the right to check on the technical condition of nuclear armaments. The dispute over the Ukrainian "nuclear button," which is currently under the control of Commander in Chief Shaposhnikov, will be the subject of discussions between Ukraine and Russia over the next month.

Kozyrev, Stankevich, Grachev Interviewed

MK2301100193 Moscow KURANTY in Russian
23 Jan 93 p 2

[Interviews with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, Belarusian Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Stankevich, and Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev by Aleksandr Nadzharov; places and dates not given: "Is the CIS Held Together by Optimism?"]

[Text] KURANTY'S special correspondent talks with Minsk meeting participants:

Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev:

It is now possible to talk about the viability of the Commonwealth and the desire of all CIS states to strengthen it. It is a different matter that each one stresses its own interests. On border questions or economic issues, for example. The CIS is actively viable, and this quality is strengthening all the time. As for the degree of flexibility of forms of cooperation, they can be very diverse. The states of our Commonwealth definitely have the right to choose. Those who want to will accede to the Charter. It is also open for signature.

Stanislav Stankevich, chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet:

At the preliminary meetings it proved possible to reach agreement on virtually everything. I expect the level of understanding of problems of intrastate interests to rise. The best way to solve these problems is germane cooperation within the framework of the CIS. This is in keeping with our common strategic interests. But we sometimes succumb to the passions of the moment. For example, some people in our republic think that it would be a good thing to introduce a transit transport tax in Belarus. But when all the consequences were calculated it proved to be a bad idea.

Now to the subject of nuclear weapons. As far as Belarus is concerned, first, we favor true nuclear-free status. Second, we realize that this cannot be done instantaneously. Third, we realize that the nuclear weapons on our territory belong to Russia and are under Russian subordination. We want agreement on all these questions not with some abstract military structures, but with Russia. In the final analysis we will be realists. After all, the nuclear troops on our territory are Russian troops. They are subordinate to Russia, and I think that to think otherwise would mean creating a mass of unnecessary difficulties. It is therefore very difficult to separate strategic nuclear troops from the rest, and it is essential for them to remain in a common system. We would like this to be the case.

Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev:

We initialed the main points; the only problems remaining for Russia is to relate to space reconnaissance. I consider that this must be [as published] part of the CIS, since the satellites and their launches are Russian. Therefore anyone wishing to participate must sign a bilateral agreement.

We rejected the draft nuclear agreements proposed to us. Because of the Ukrainian stance of minimum reductions in the composition of the strategic forces. Also Kazakhstan considers that, on the contrary, they must be expanded to the maximum, including strategic reconnaissance. There is a desire to get rid of all strategic forces with the exception of the nuclear forces. For all these reasons we have not yet signed the agreement on nuclear forces, but I think this will happen soon, after further work is done on it. It will evidently include literally a couple of points: agreement that at bilateral talks Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan will determine the composition of the common strategic forces that they want included in the CIS. Second, a recommendation that the heads of state sign this agreement at the next conference.

More on Grachev Interview

PM2501133393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Jan 93 p 1

[Report on an interview with Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation minister of defense, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Oleg Falichev

and ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshev; place and date not given: "We Advocate Collective Security"]

[Text] At the request of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Oleg Falichev and ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin, Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation minister of defense, commented on how the discussion of issues went at the 21 January session of the Council of CIS Ministers of Defense. The conversation took place on the eve of the meeting of the Commonwealth heads of state, while the final outcome of the talks, including those on defense problems, was not yet known.

Speaking of the differences of opinion which appeared in the course of the defense ministers' discussion of the Strategic Forces' composition, Army Gen. P. Grachev noted that Russia is proposing to use the term "Strategic Nuclear Forces," taking this concept to include not only the missile complexes themselves, but also nuclear munitions deployed on strategic bombers, missile attack warning systems, antimissile defense systems, air defense systems, and several other control and guidance systems. Some independent states, as well as the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command, do not wish to include all these components in the Strategic Nuclear Forces.

These differences were particularly clear at the Council of Defense Ministers session when Russia's and Ukraine's positions were compared. The Ukrainian side did not agree that the Strategic Nuclear Forces located on its territory belong to Russia. The Ukrainian representatives consider that they are Ukrainian property, but, at the same time, Ukraine is rejecting the status of a nuclear state. A certain paradox arises here. It is clear that we will not come to an agreement at the level of defense ministers, Army Gen. Pavel Grachev noted. He said that this issue should obviously be resolved at heads of state level.

The political accord on the Strategic Forces, which was reached at the Moscow meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian presidents, remains in force, the minister emphasized. Ukraine is giving our specialists access to the nuclear systems located on its territory for servicing and maintenance, inspection and maintenance work, and the replacement of units and parts. As President Boris Yeltsin has already emphasized, Russia is taking responsibility for guaranteeing Ukraine's nuclear security.

Describing the position of the Republic of Belarus, Army Gen. Pavel Grachev noted that "everything here has already been decided; Belarus has ratified all agreements on nuclear weapons, and all that remains is to specify the schedule for their removal from Belarusian territory and their subsequent destruction."

Kazakhstan's position is near to that of Belarus. Kazakhstan's minister of defense has proposed to Russia a bilateral examination of the question of the procedure

for destroying the nuclear weapons located on this state's territory, and this question will be resolved in the near future.

As concerns the draft agreement on specifying the Strategic Forces' composition, Minister of Defense Grachev assesses that it has still not been sufficiently worked out. Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan must bilaterally specify what "Strategic Forces" means. About a month may be spent on this. When the list of combined units and units coming under this definition has been drawn up, it could be submitted for discussion at the next Council of Heads of State session, the Russian minister of defense said.

Speaking about the agreement on the use of satellite communications for military purposes, Army Gen. Grachev noted that this draft is not in the interests of the Russian Ministry of Defense. "We consider that space communications facilities should be used on the basis of bilateral accords with the interested CIS states. The Military-Space Forces are Russian forces," the minister emphasized.

Grachev said that the Russian delegation agreed with the draft agreement on long-range navigation support services, but on the condition of proportional financial contribution by all CIS states for this program.

The Russian minister of defense also expressed his opinion on the problem of bringing the Commonwealth states' military legislations in line with each other. We supported the decision to submit this question for the Interparliamentary Assembly's scrutiny, he said.

Touching on the problem of using budgetary appropriations to maintain the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command, Grachev emphasized that Russia is ready to approve the report which has been submitted, but at the same time suggested that the High Command should try and implement the agreement regulating the independent states' transfers of contributions for its maintenance. Unfortunately, several Commonwealth member states, specifically Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, have yet to transfer the agreed sums to the relevant account.

In reply to the correspondents' question about the need to preserve the Commonwealth's common defense structures, Army Gen. Pavel Grachev said: "We remain optimistic and believe that any Commonwealth, even if it comprises only the six states which signed the Treaty on Collective Security in Tashkent, will remain intact. Many Commonwealth member states clearly realize that they cannot create their own army or a system to guarantee their national security on their own. Their attempt for a rapprochement with Russia is already evident. If they show that they have an interest in cooperating, Russia is ready for a dialogue as equals. We have always advocated and will continue to advocate a unified system of collective security."

Belarus Says N-Arms Belong to Russia

LD2201095693 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 0900 GMT 22 Jan 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Whether the Minsk meeting of heads of state and government will result in anything or not, will be seen at the end of the day. But, at this moment, we already have some rather sensational news: Belarus officials have stated that nuclear weapons situated on the territory of the republic unconditionally belong to Russia. Perhaps, this fact will cause complications when the package of military issues is discussed because positions of the other nuclear republics—Kazakhstan and Ukraine—do not coincide with that of Belarus.

RUSSIA

U.S. Criticized for Unfair MTCR Application

PM2001112993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Jan 93 p 3

[Report by Manki Ponomarev: "What's Sauce for the Goose..."]

[Text] Three-day Russian-U.S. consultations on the observance of the rules of the nonproliferation of missiles and missile technology have been held in Moscow. The participants in the consultations examined a number of serious issues. Of these, the problem of cryogenic (oxyhydrogen) engine deliveries from Russia to India occupied a central place.

As we know, some time ago, an agreement was reached between Moscow and Delhi to the effect that Russia would supply such engines on a commercial basis for the implementation of the Indian space program. They would be mounted on Indian space rockets and would make it possible for heavy artificial civilian satellites to be put into orbit.

The United States has unilaterally assessed this agreement as a violation of the rules of the nonproliferation of missiles and missile technology, however. In spite of the obvious facts, Washington has started to claim that the Russian cryogenic engines come under the category of "dual purpose" items, although it is clear to anyone with even a scrap of knowledge that rocket engines with liquid hydrogen as a fuel and liquid oxygen as an oxidizing agent are practically inapplicable for military purposes. Matters reached the point where the United States declared sanctions against the Russian Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Scientific Research and the Indian Space Research Organization.

Naturally Russia was not about to give in to this pressure and confirmed its resolve to carry on fulfilling the

contract for the supply of cryogenic engines for the Indian space program. As your KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent found out, even at the recent consultations in Moscow, the American side, like in a number of other cases, continued to adhere to the policy of double standards.

We know, for example, that according to the American classification, China is in the same category of countries as India—that is, those subject to the rules of the nonproliferation of missile technologies. This did not prevent the United States from concluding an agreement with the PRC on the launching of nine U.S. satellites by Chinese launch vehicles (three of them have already been put into near-earth orbit). After all, the Americans are not just putting satellites on the Chinese rockets, but also their own booster units [razgonnyye bloki], as well as an engine system [dvigatel'naya sistema] as the top stage. And they do not consider this to be a departure from the rules whose observance by others they watch over so zealously.

Washington sets itself this standard. A completely different standard for Russia. At the same consultations in Moscow, they resolutely condemned the Russian-Indian collaboration in the sphere of technologies for civilian space research, which is being carried out on the basis of previously reached agreements. Obviously, Washington's tough stances can be explained by a desire to ensure preconditions for the monopolization by American corporations of the civilian space rocket services market, rather than by worries that India will really create intercontinental missiles.

So, what's sauce for the goose, is not sauce for the gander, so to speak. But the question is, on what basis can one side be granted the role of the goose and the other the gander?

Military, Nuclear Accord Reached With India

*LD2901071193 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0400 GMT 29 Jan 93*

[Text] Russia and India will develop their cooperation in the military sphere. A preliminary agreement to this effect was signed in the Indian capital by the two countries' ministers of defense, Pavel Grachev and Sharad Pawar. The agreement envisages not only exchanging information and visits, but setting up joint production in India of modern armaments and military equipment to be supplied to third countries. An agreement has been reached on supplying to India spare parts for military equipment; 70 percent of which was exported from the former USSR.

Grachev told an RIA correspondent that the Russian side is prepared to supply submarines—without nuclear reactors—to India. All these issues will be discussed during an official visit of the Russian Federation defense minister to India, which is to take place in March this year.

Kozyrev, Indian Counterpart Speak

*LD2901100293 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0200 GMT 29 Jan 93*

[Text] Russia and India share the same point of view: it is inadmissible to allow new nuclear states to come into being, including in the Asian-Pacific region. Andrey Kozyrev, Russia's minister of foreign affairs, said this today in an exclusive interview with the RIA agency on completion of Russian-Indian talks. Issues relating to nonproliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons were discussed at the talks, as were questions concerning missiles and missile technologies. The Russian side is in favor of strengthening the policy of nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons. Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dinesh Singh spoke in a similar vein. He confirmed that India intended to develop its nuclear industry only for peaceful applications.

Foreign Intelligence Service Proliferation Report

Nuclear, CBW Risk Analyzed

*MK2701091593 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Jan 93 p 1*

[Report by Pavel Koltsov under the rubric "Special Services" and the general heading "Russian Intelligence Report—Freely Available; Tomorrow It Will Be Possible To Obtain It From the Hands of the FIS Leadership"]

[Text] Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS), and some other high-ranking FIS staffers will meet with journalists at the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry Press Center on Zubovskiy Boulevard Thursday 28 January. At the meeting an analysis report by the Russian intelligence service will be presented: "New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction." Never before has the country's intelligence service openly published its reports. According to the FIS leadership, this step is evidence of a substantive restructuring in the Russian intelligence service's system of priorities and its readiness to play a real part in resolving acute international problems.

The document is unusual in that it is based on information obtained by specific intelligence systems [spetsificheskimi sredstvami razvedki] as well as open information from Russian and foreign sources.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has obtained an account of some of the main points of the report.

The threat of proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons across the globe is seen in the report as one of the main factors capable of undermining hopes for the establishment of a just and lasting world order. The criteria used in analyzing the consequences of the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are specified, countries are graded according to the possession of weapons of mass destruction—possessor countries, "threshold" countries, and "near-threshold"

countries, and the methodology applied in this connection is explained. Reference material is appended to the report, containing the FIS' generalized assessments of the degree of advancement along the path of creating weapons of mass destruction attained by certain states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The report devotes particular attention to the question of the five nuclear powers belonging to the "global club" (Britain, China, Russia, the United States, France). In the opinion of FIS experts, progress in the nuclear sphere cannot be considered the exclusive prerogative of the members of this influential club. In addition to eliminating the temptation for certain "threshold" states to join the club, the nuclear powers should, on the one hand, proceed resolutely ahead along the path of real nuclear disarmament, and on the other, increase the effectiveness of existing mechanisms for monitoring [kontrol za] the proliferation of fissionable materials and nuclear technologies with a military application.

At one time, the report says, official representatives of China, Britain, and France used to say that the "go-ahead" for them to proceed in the direction of reducing their own nuclear weapons would only come when the USSR and the United States cut their nuclear forces by 50 percent. The treaty signed in Moscow 3 January 1993 cuts those nuclear forces by virtually two-thirds, which certainly opens up the opportunity for further reductions in nuclear potential on a multilateral rather than a bilateral basis.

In the opinion of FIS analysts, one of the most serious shortcomings in the present regime of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the lack of provisions, in existing international treaties, to ensure the creation of an effective mechanism for verification [verifikatsiya] of instances of the development [razrabotka] of prototypes of specific types of weapons of mass destruction and components for them. The existing prerogatives are confined solely to the monitoring of nuclear materials and facilities for their utilization, which, needs further improvement, however.

The authors of the report deem it necessary to focus attention on this, since 1995 sees the expiry of the term of operation of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the main international instrument enshrining states' commitments in the nuclear sphere today. The question of extending the treaty indefinitely will arise in this connection.

FIS Director Primakov Reads Report

*LD2801161793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1350 GMT 28 Jan 93*

[Text] A briefing by the Foreign Intelligence Service was held at the Foreign Ministry press center today. Anatoliy Fedorov, our correspondent, reports:

[Fedorov] Foreign Intelligence chief Yevgeniy Primakov presented a report which only recently was top secret,

called "A new challenge following the cold war—the proliferation of mass destruction weapons." This problem affects Russia's immediate interests. A situation in which new states which possess these weapons can come into being along the Russian border does appear unacceptable. This is made more serious by the fact that the processes of emergent statehood within many former Union republics are incomplete. Some of these republics are in the grip of the conflagration of ethnic, national, and political conflicts. There is here also an obvious tendency whereby neighboring states can be drawn into these conflicts. Some of these states can be classified as striving to possess mass destruction weapons, or else they already possess some types of these weapons.

The preamble of the report says that certain slowness of the process of concentrating nuclear arms in Russia itself which, within these terms of reference, is the USSR's legal successor, is a most serious problem. Moreover, rather influential forces are making themselves felt here—despite accords reached earlier, these forces would like to preserve their states' nuclear status permanently.

[Begin Primakov recording] The proliferation of mass destruction weapons constitutes, in a most negative way, an element of global destabilization, because it creates a serious impediment to the process of arms cuts. I would also like to mention—and intelligence services are dealing with this issue themselves—that a new type of terrorism may emerge. In this context, the enhanced interest of international mafia structures in organizing illegal trade in fissile and other especially dangerous materials causes serious alarm. Moreover, foreign intelligence service experts think that it does not only bear witness to the desire of the mafia structures to get maximum profit from their re-sale operations, but that in the future it may possibly create exceptionally dangerous situations connected with the use of these materials for blackmail purposes.

The report clearly defines three groups of countries with regard to the process of the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, apart from the so-called global or nuclear club. The report analyses the additional irritants which now cause this process of proliferation to take place. Special attention is focused here on the necessity of stepping up the protection of nuclear arsenals, the control over the nuclear brain drain—moreover, this problem is not just a Russian one; experts of the Foreign Intelligence Service think that this problem has international dimensions. Thus, by the year 2000, for instance, out of 30,000 people who work in the nuclear arms complex in the United States, 15,000 people will have been made redundant, sacked, if you like; 14,500 people will remain, whilst 15,500 people will be made redundant by this complex and, naturally, problems of possible emigration and nuclear brain drain will arise here, too.

It is not just real threats of this kind that exist, however; what also exists is certain misinformation and concoctions which sometimes emerge by accident and sometimes by design. The concoction concerning red mercury is among this latter category. It is alleged that large amounts of it were taken out of the country, but, according to our data, it was a large operation, connected in practical terms with money-laundering operations. Naturally, we raise the question of the need for comprehensive measures in order to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. [end recording]

More on Primakov Briefing

OW2801153593 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1436 GMT 28 Jan 93

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] It is rather early to talk of the emergence of a "nuclear brain drain" from Russia to other countries of the CIS, but if we do not take appropriate measures, this may lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This was announced in Moscow on Thursday at a press conference by the director of the foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, Yevgeniy Primakov. He also noted that "so far there is no threat that scientists directly employed in Russian military-related nuclear enterprises will leave." The leader of the Russian intelligence service announced that the report by the American press that Russian scientists allegedly work in Egypt to modernize missiles has not been confirmed. The much-talked-of report on the Russian export of the famous "red mercury" turned out to be a myth also. According to the conclusion of the Russian Academy of Sciences and experts of the Russian Intelligence Service, Primakov noted, "red mercury" as a component used in the production of nuclear weapons, in reality does not exist. According to the reports of the Intelligence Service, the large financial transactions related to it were part of the operation to wipe out illegal receipt of materials from the narcotic business as well.

On the situation around Iraq, the Intelligence director emphasized that "Russia thinks that in relations towards Iraq it is necessary to take adequate measures since this country violates some of the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations. But we are convinced that the main emphasis should be on the political means of settlement in the Persian Gulf.

"Unilateral action on the international arena has never brought any positive results, especially when the UN and other members of the world community are working there" Primakov said.

Highlighted as 'First Open Report'

LD2801133693 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1200 GMT 28 Jan 93

[Text] An analytical report on the topic "A new challenge since the cold war—the proliferation of mass-destruction

weapons" is being presented at a news conference at the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry today. Yevgeniy Primakov, the Russian director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, noted that this is the first open report in the history of the Russian Intelligence Service, which was prepared on the basis of many materials, including those of an intelligence nature. According to various estimates, 20-30 states in the world have the potential to create nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the means to deliver them. The infrastructures for their production are indistinguishable to visual detection.

It is believed that a realistic need in chemical weapons during a major and rather prolonged regional conflict amounts on average to 100 tonnes. According to the estimates of the authors of the report, stockpiles of chemical weapons are in practice considerably greater than these figures. But it is practically impossible to detect 100 or even 500 tonnes of concealed chemical weapons in any country without secret services, the report says.

Protection, Care of Scientists Urged

LD2801132793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1253 GMT 28 Jan 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Nikishov and Sergey Staroselskiy]

[Text] Moscow January 28 TASS—"As a rule, Russian experts, employed in the nuclear weapons industry, are not eager to go to any other countries. The danger is posed by specialists working in adjacent areas. They may be used abroad for organising the production of separate parts for nuclear weapons," director of the Russian External Intelligence Service Yevgeniy Primakov told a press conference at the Russian Foreign Ministry here today. "Neither we, nor our partners, possess information that our specialists are already working in this area," Primakov added.

It was noted by Gennadiy Yevstafiyev, department chief in the Russian External Intelligence Service, "if Russia and the international community fail to exert sufficient efforts shortly to ensure normal conditions for the life of these scientists, to raise their status, we may be confronted with a situation when some of them may try to go to some foreign countries, however."

The head of the Russian intelligence further said that there were no thefts of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials from Russia or other CIS countries.

Asked about reported attempts to smuggle radioactive substances out of Russia, Yevstafiyev confirmed that there were, indeed, some such attempts by individuals or even whole structures. "This is mainly done at an amateur level," he said, "but there were attempts to organise channels for smuggling them out of the country. "One of these channels, without doubt, runs through Poland," Primakov noted.

Referring to data received not only from intelligence sources, but also from scientific circles, Primakov said that there was no such thing in existence as red mercury, about which the press had written so much. "At the same time," he noted, "that deals, involving large amounts of money, were recorded lately. According to information gleaned by the Russian External Intelligence Service and several European special services, they were concluded by merging mafiosi structures, which wanted to launder their money in this way, including profits made on narcobusiness".

Primakov said that he did not receive any official invitation to visit the United States so far. He said that the Russian intelligence was not informed in advance about the strikes at Iraq, although the take-off of planes and missile launchings were recorded, of course.

Speaking about his attitude to defectors from the Russian special services to the West, who were recently described as heroes by some people, Primakov said: "Traitors are always traitors, and there are traitors everywhere. As a matter of fact, there was not a single case when a defector, who has betrayed his cause, his oath and comrades, had done it for political reasons."

Seen as Post-Cold War Challenge

LD2801121393 Moscow *ITAR-TASS* in English
1143 GMT 28 Jan 93

[By *ITAR-TASS* diplomatic correspondents Sergey Nikishov and Sergey Staroselskiy]

[Text] Moscow January 28 TASS—Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) regards issues concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as "one of main problems and the main challenge of the post-cold war period, according to FIS Director Yevgeniy Primakov. A special board to deal with these issues has been set up within the FIS.

"A new challenge in the post-cold war period: The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" is the subject of an analytical report presented on Thursday by the FIS leadership.

At a press conference in the Russian Foreign Ministry press centre, Primakov pointed out that this first-ever non-classified report had been prepared by the FIS on the strength of many materials, including intelligence data.

The main danger of the proliferation of the WMD is in the fact that it "superimposes itself on the development of conflict situations at the regional level," Primakov emphasised. The departure from tough countervailing and the end of the cold war slackened control over the development of conflict situations at the regional level, he said.

In this connection, the FIS director maintains, "the Helsinki agreements ceased to be a reliable guarantor of the borders of many newly established states in Europe."

In addition, the proliferation of the WMD introduces the element of destabilisation at the global level and puts obstacles to arms reductions.

Speaking about Russia's specific interest in the field of control over WMD, Primakov emphasised that "Russia is not interested at all in the emergence of new states possessing WMD along the perimeter of its borders".

'Black List' of Countries Provided

OW2801121193 Moscow *INTERFAX* in English
1146 GMT 28 Jan 93

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Sixteen countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America have fallen in the "black list" of the Russian Intelligence Service which thinks that they possess or are "on the road" to possessing this or that type of weapon of mass destruction. The evidence for this assessment will be presented in the first open report by the Intelligence Service: "The New Challenge After the 'Cold War': The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction." On Thursday [28 January] it was presented at a press conference in Morsk by the director of the Service, Yevgeniy Primakov.

The authors of the report note that the 16 countries they have chosen are by no means all who have weapons of mass destruction or are trying to acquire them, but are the "main characters". In alphabetical order they are:

Algeria (the resources for the creation of weapons of mass destruction are insignificant)

Argentina (it has the potential but no reliable data that the country is carrying out a serious program of a military character)

Brazil (has the resources, there is evidence of the existence of a highly developed research program but there are no reports on the possession of nuclear weapons)

Egypt (there is no evidence of the possession of nuclear weapons, it is not considered that it can possess them in the foreseeable future)

India ("may be moved to the list of countries who unofficially have nuclear weapons", has chemical weapons, "not less than five military centers are related to the military-biological sphere")

Iraq (carried out the processing of nuclear weapons, but by the beginning of "Desert Storm I" [as received] she had not acquired the weapons, now it is undertaking efforts to revive missile enterprises which produce means of making weapons of mass destruction).

Iran (does not possess nuclear weapons but is carrying out a program of research, possesses chemical weapons "at the very least of two types", has military related biological program but has no offensive biological weapons)

Israel ("unofficially has nuclear weapons", and a reserve of chemical weapons locally produced, "there is no "direct evidence" of the possession of biological weapons)

North Korea (does not possess nuclear weapons though it has an "advanced" program, has program on chemical and biological weapons)

Libya (no evidence of the possession of nuclear weapons, it cannot produce nuclear weapons "in the foreseeable future", has 70-80 tons of chemical weapons, at the starting level of research in the area of biological weapons)

Pakistan ("has nuclear potential of military nature", no evidence of the possession of chemical weapons, but work is proceeding, accumulated a large reserve of pesticides)

Syria (has limited resources for the creation or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction in full volume, has no nuclear weapons, but has potential for chemical weapons, no biological weapons or programs directed toward it)

Taiwan (is capable of creating components of weapons of mass destruction and the means for acquiring them but it does not possess them)

Chile (has no nuclear weapons, has a small reserve of chemical weapons)

South Africa (may possess weapons of mass destruction, but it has no nuclear weapons, no evidence that the country has chemical or biological weapons)

South Korea (probably does not have its own weapons of mass destruction, though the industrial potential is great)

In the preface to the report, Primakov notes that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents a threat to the general stability and creates new regional conflicts of a more dangerous character. Primakov stressed that the situation where states possessing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons may emerge in the perimeters of the Russian border "is unacceptable."

According to experts of the Intelligence Service, in a number of zones of high risk—Middle East, Persian Gulf, South and North Eastern Asia—on the map will be placed the very survival of the state. [sentence as received] They do not exclude, for example, the possibility that in the case of a transition into a critical level of conflict between India and Pakistan, the "prize" for the country that emerges on top will be the disintegration and practical elimination of the survival of the other country.

Of special danger, in the opinion of the authors of the report, is the ecological threat related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Already today, they write, on the territory of the former USSR districts

where the level of radiation makes them unfit for life amounts to 4 million square kilometers, and in the U.S., 15 thousand zones of dangerous chemical and radioactive pollution have been declared. The experts are convinced that the currently existing mechanisms of international control are not adequately effective and a complete complex of global measures in order to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is necessary.

DPRK Said Developing N-Arms

*SK2901021293 Seoul YONHAP in English 0155 GMT
29 Jan 93*

[Text] Moscow, Jan. 29 (YONHAP)—Russia's external intelligence service, in its first such expose ever, has disclosed that North Korea is developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

The former KGB made the disclosure Wednesday in a 130-page intelligence report, entitled "A Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons is a new Challenge in the Post-Cold War Era."

North Korea has been working for many years on the development of nuclear as well as chemical and biological weapons. The purpose of their development is military application, the report says.

It is the first time North Korea's nuclear and other weapons programs were made public by an intelligence organization of Russia, which has a military pact with Pyongyang.

According to the report, North Korea is standing on the threshold of developing nuclear bombs. Experts of North Korea's People's Army were taking part in the development program.

But North Korea is unable to make it through the final stage of the nuclear development plan because of technical problems, the report says.

Moreover, North Korea is conducting experiments with viruses of various communicative diseases such as anthrax, cholera and plague at a number of universities, medical colleges and research institutes while working on chemical weapons in extreme secrecy, the report says.

In addition, North Korea is stepping up production of missiles, mainly scud-c missiles, and testing its first domestically developed missile, named "Nodong No. 1," with a range of 1,000 kilometers.

Those missiles are being produced as a means of delivering nuclear warheads and other weapons of mass destruction, the report adds.

The report says there are not many top-class experts in these fields in North Korea, however, and as a result it is trying hard to recruit foreign scientists and engineers.

Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the external intelligence service, told a press conference Wednesday he did not

believe North Korea "currently possesses" a nuclear bomb though it has the "potential" to develop one.

In a question-and-answer session with reporters, Primakov also said there was a possibility that out of work Russian nuclear scientists could go to foreign countries, offering their expertise.

But there has not been a single top-class Russian scientist who has gone abroad thus far, Primakov said.

Reports on Exports of Military Technologies Continue

Yeltsin Issues Directive

PM2501144593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 22 Jan 93 p 1

[Untitled "Chronicle" report]

[Text] The Russian president's directive "On Introducing Controls Over the Export From the Russian Federation of Equipment, Materials, and Technologies Used in the Manufacture of Missile Weapons" approves the list submitted by the government of equipment, materials, and technologies whose export is controlled and carried out only under license. A new list of export organizations granted the right to export strategically significant goods has also been approved. Interested persons and organizations can see the list of equipment, materials, and technologies designated for export at the ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI editorial office.

Arms Exports Remain at 1992 Level

PM2601144393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Jan 93 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report under the "Hello, Weapons!" rubric: "Shooting Exports"]

[Text] This year the volume of Russia's arms exports will be no lower than last year, when they totaled around \$4 billion, Viktor Glukhikh, chairman of the Russian Federation Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry, has announced. The main consumers of Russian military technology will be China and India, to which aircraft and antimissile systems are to be delivered. Russia is also trying to sell combat aircraft to Malaysia and to deliver space equipment to Indonesia. In mid-February it is planned to take part in an arms exhibition in the United Arab Emirates.

Viktor Glukhikh noted that the serious reduction in the volume of Russia's arms exports begun in the late eighties had brought the country losses of approximately \$7.5 billion. Last year Russia had only a 17-percent share of world sales, while the United States had a 56-percent share.

Smart-Shell Artillery Exports To Resume

MK2901080193 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No. 5, 31 Jan 93 (Signed to press 26 Jan)
MN BUSINESS supplement p 8

[Report by German Lomanov: "Exports of Unique Weapons Could Make Russia Hundreds of Millions of Dollars. But Their Series Production Was Unjustifiably Halted. Defense Plants, Scientific Research Institutes, and Design Bureaus Intend to Resume Production by Joining Together in an Association"]

[Excerpt] The recently secret Smelchak and Santimetr artillery complexes developed under the leadership of chief designer Vladimir Vishnevskiy have no equal in the world. A laser guidance system corrects the shell during the final sector of its flight, directing it accurately to its target. The system needs to see a target for only three seconds in order to be able to hit the "bullseye." It is exceptionally efficient: If you need, for example, to hit an enemy firing position from a hidden position, you only need between one and three "smart" shells. In this kind of situation you would need more than 100 conventional shells. The ideas built into these complexes make possible the development in the very near future of "fire and forget" weapons. You can forget because you know that you have a hit with your first shell.

The complexes have now been declassified and have sparked the interest of military circles in a number of countries, and the Russian Government has authorized the export of Smelchak (authorization for exports of the Santimetr complex is being finalized). The price is a commercial secret; indeed it is hard to determine since there is no similar weapon in the world. So the partners are going to discuss the cost of any contract very carefully. But it is already clear that complexes which Russia can now sell without detriment to our Army will make Russia hundreds of millions of dollars. Naturally the stocks will have to be replenished—preferably with more sophisticated systems. But in 1990-1990 series production of the complexes was halted completely, and the design team which developed them dispersed to various enterprises. Vladimir Vishnevskiy managed with difficulty to retain a backbone of development engineers, bringing them together in the joint stock-company NTK [expansion unknown] Ametekh (Automation and Mechanization of Technologies) and the Divkon (Diversification and Conversion) experimental design bureau. Ametekh has managed to maintain ties with allied enterprises but is concerned mainly with civilian production. For two years now the company has been working on the development of various kinds of mini-equipment essential for the development of private farming and small business. Ametekh's program includes tractors and reapers, attachments for road construction, and mini-plants for processing grain, meat, and milk. [passage omitted]

Indicators Show Drop in Arms Sales

LD2401225593 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 2000 GMT 24 Jan 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Here is some information from the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of United States and Canada, reported by the RIA agency. It says that in the last three years there has been a steady decline in the world export of Russian weapons and military equipment. According to some data, exports have been declining almost by half every year. All of this despite the fact that in many types of technology, such as missiles for example, Russia is an unsurpassed world leader.

Foreign Ministry Official on CW Convention

PM2201111593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 21 Jan 93 p 2

[Interview with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov by RIA correspondent Vitaliy Dymarskiy in Paris; date not given: "Russia Will Have To Destroy 40,000 Tonnes of Toxic Chemicals"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] It has already been reported that a three-day ceremony to sign the international convention banning the development, production, storage, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction took place at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris 13-15 January. Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev was one of the first to put his signature to this document, which envisages the complete eradication of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. The convention, the need for which has long been talked about in the international community, has become a reality. It will have to be reckoned with both by the countries which have signed it, and by the countries yet to accede to it (a number of Arab states, North Korea), as it incorporates a "coercion mechanism"—embargoes, trade restrictions, and other economic sanctions against "non-signatories."

How does Russia view the convention, its importance, and the problems it will create for our country? Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov answers these and other questions in an interview in Paris by RIA's own correspondent Vitaliy Dymarskiy, exclusively for ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI.

[Berdennikov] Russia raised the question of banning chemical weapons as far back as at the end of the last century. At that time, they were the most horrific of weapons. As we know, they were widely used in World War I. The Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons in warfare was signed in 1925. It is largely thanks to this document that these weapons were virtually abandoned in World War II. But then many countries, including the USSR, actively set about developing and storing chemical weapons. A slow and lengthy talks process went on simultaneously.

Now, finally, the most radical step has been taken: The convention not only prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of these weapons, but it also envisages their total destruction. This is a first in the disarmament sphere.

[Dymarskiy] There is much talk of the Convention's revolutionary nature behind the scenes at the Paris meeting. How, in your view, is this manifested?

[Berdennikov] We agree with this evaluation. Primarily, it concerns the monitoring mechanism built into the convention, which is unprecedented in its reliability. What I mean is the so-called system of verification on demand. It is sufficient for any state acceding to the convention to file a request with a specially created organization (to be based in The Hague) so that an inspection group is dispatched immediately to verify the suspected location or facility, and moreover the petitioned side is not entitled to refuse their visit. Meanwhile, specific procedures are laid down to prevent abuses if the matter concerns the civilian chemical industry rather than military objectives. This monitoring mechanism is indeed a breakthrough which will facilitate the solution of other potential disarmament problems in the future.

[Dymarskiy] All commentaries about the convention carried in the Western press mention Russia in one form or another. Much is said about the complexities Russia will have to face in honoring the commitments undertaken, about its technical inadequacies, and about the fact that it is more expensive to destroy chemical weapons than to produce them.

[Berdennikov] There is a great deal of journalistic assumption here. Of course, there are difficulties. But the real picture is this: There are 40,000 tonnes of toxic chemicals in our country, partly contained in warheads and partly in large silos. But neither the warheads nor the silos are everlasting—they are getting old, they are starting to leak. Convention or no convention, these toxins need to be destroyed. How should this be done—in unison with the whole world, or on a unilateral basis? In my view, the answer is clear. Furthermore, now we can rely on specific help from many states.

For us, the main condition is not to damage the environment. A special interdepartmental committee led by academician Kuntsevich is working out the first stage of the destruction of chemical weapons. Since ecological movements demanded the closure of the Chapayevsk plant, which was destroying chemical weapons, nobody has been willing to take on this process [proizvodstvo]. Everybody says: We are in favor of it, but not in our backyard.

It has to be said that the actual convention which Russia signed and which, consequently, it will honor, bans certain methods of destruction which pollute the environment (such as burning in the open air.) But our Russian standards are quite strict. Stricter, for instance, than America's: They deploy direct burning techniques

[tekhnologiya pryamovo szhiganiya] inside the canister (with the appropriate filters, of course), whereas in our country neutralization is required before burning.

[Dymarskiy] What further steps do you anticipate in the disarmament sphere?

[Berdennikov] A favorable situation has developed as regards nuclear test bans: For the first time ever three countries—Russia, the United States, and France—have observed this ban over such a long period. I think that the prospect of beginning talks in order to reach a decision envisaging a definitive and irreversible moratorium on tests is a real one. Another major problem is the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Here, too, more reliable international agreements need to be attained.

Defector's Allegations on Biological Weapons Eyed

LD2301193793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1443 GMT 23 Jan 93

[Commentary by Mayak London correspondent Aleksandr Malikov]

[Text] The lead in the program shown on BBC-2 was played by the former director of a scientific institutes in St. Petersburg, Vladimir Pasechnik. In 1989, he defected in London only—as he put it—in order to clear his conscience and tell the real truth about the fact that Russia, contrary to the 1972 International Convention, had during the perestroyka years been continuing work on biological weapons. At the time, the information transmitted to the British side by Mr. Pasechnik, who changed his citizenship, deepened the West's suspicions and was extremely important. It later served as grounds for a private letter from British and U.S. diplomats to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which they expressed their concern that the creation of biological weapons could be continuing in secret from the Russian Federation president and without his knowledge.

Then, in September of last year, successful mutual consultations took place. As for the present, both a BBC correspondent who visited St. Petersburg and the program announcer—with the help of individual remarks from Vladimir Pasechnik—attempted to heap a goodly number of doubts on whether Russia's programs for developing plague had indeed been finally stopped.

As a viewer, for me the first serious snag in this attempt was the lack of any concrete facts, apart from mere hints, in the reportage from the Institute in St. Petersburg. The second was Vladimir Pasechnik's own opinion about what is going on in an institution he has not been to for several years.

Third, appearing live on the BBC program, Lawrence Eagleburger—by then already former U.S. secretary of state—failed to back the suspicions directly. On the

contrary, he voiced 100 percent confidence in the honesty and loyalty of Russia's President Yeltsin to the promises to put an end to work on manufacturing biological weapons.

When the announcer asked him what advice he could give to the new U.S. Administration, Eagleburger recalled that the Russian and U.S. sides have recently been working very closely on this problem, and he recommended Clinton and his new team continue the dialogue and process of mutual inspections. Inspections are indeed the practical and simple key to opening many doors, including the doors of suspicion, if any such arise. What is the point of reinventing the wheel by indulging in such unconvincing journalistic research? A brief postscript to the above. Having got everything off his chest, defector to the West, doctor of Medical Sciences Vladimir Pasechnik does not intend to go back. He evidently prefers to work in the West, with a clear conscience and a good salary. He preferred not to go into details about exactly what he was working on.

Rumored 'Missile Explosion' Explained

PM2201095593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jan 93 pp 1, 5

[Report by Aleksey Tarasov: "Krasnoyarsk Kray Armed and Very Dangerous. At the Start of the New Year It Was Just a Hair's Breadth from Catastrophe"]

[Text] Krasnoyarsk—While the presidents of Russia and the United States were deciding the fate of the nuclear arsenals in the Kremlin, the distant Siberian cities of Krasnoyarsk, Sosnovoborsk, Krasnoyarsk-26, and Krasnoyarsk-35 were in a very real sense of the word agitated about nuclear missile problems. For several days in a row rumors of a missile explosion at a secret plant, resulting in a radioactive discharge and a large number of casualties, spread here with the speed of a Siberian blizzard.

What actually happened was this: A train arrived at the "Fakel" Chemical Plant in Krasnoyarsk-35 carrying missiles removed from active duty with the Pacific Ocean Fleet and due to be scrapped: That is to say, the fuel would be drained off, the residue neutralized, and the missile casings reduced to scrap metal. The nuclear warheads are destroyed separately from the delivery vehicles and therefore the missiles are sent for dismantling and recycling minus the warhead. That is what happened this time, too (consequently the nuclear explosion which, according to press reports was "miraculously avoided," simply could not have happened at all).

But the missiles were filled with heptyl, an extraordinarily dangerous liquid fuel—it is highly toxic and has a paralyzing and asphyxiating effect. Many of its characteristics are comparable only with modern war gases. The missile fuel could have caused irreparable harm because, as the "Fakel" Plant's specialists explained, eight missiles arrived in defective freight cars—their thermostatic control system was not working. Since the

crystallization temperature of one of the fuel components is 11 degrees below zero, the freight cars are fitted with independent temperature control systems whose operation has to be monitored by the team escorting the load. But it was highly dubious whether anything could be expected from the monitoring team because they had celebrated the New Year holiday with a bout of heavy drinking.

It is still to be established whether the thermostatic control system broke down in transit or whether it was faulty from the outset. When it was discovered and an external inspection of the missiles was carried out, the specialists presumed that the fuel components had frozen. This was no joke. A rise in temperature could have dire consequences. If the missile's components were damaged and there was a leak of fuel, God only knows what would happen. From open publications and meager interviews with specialists it turns out that heptyl—once it has escaped from fuel tanks into the air—forms a large quantity of supertoxic chemical compounds when it comes into contact with oxygen. When heptyl comes into contact with water and soil they become contaminated for a long time and if heptyl is combined outside the standard parameters [v neshtatnykh parametrah] with an oxidant—amyl... In short, as officials acknowledge, the potential danger judged in terms of the consequences of an accident was very serious.

An emergency conference was called in Krasnoyarsk-35 attended by the director of "Kras mash," a large group of specialists, and officials responsible for the safety of the population of the kray. The administration of Sosnovoborsk (33,000 inhabitants), which is located several kilometers from Krasnoyarsk-35, was instructed to be ready to evacuate the city's people but, according to the mayor, no further information was received. He soon saw for himself that the city was completely unprepared for evacuation. Things were different in Krasnoyarsk-26 (100,000 inhabitants)—it, too, is nearby but because of the nuclear production unit there it is always on the alert. That was true this time, too—even the official press release was ready. In Krasnoyarsk with its population of almost 1 million people all the kray services had been forewarned and had initiated civil defense measures.

A further investigation of the missiles showed that the missile casing seals had not broken and there had been no fuel leak, however. The plant's commission asserts today that the fuel components had not frozen either. According to I. Zhmakov, chief of the kray administration safety administration, it is hard to establish that now but perhaps a partial crystallization had occurred.

In accordance with the chief designer's recommendations, it was a week before the "goods" in the freight cars returned to their prescribed temperature and then work began to drain off the fuel. That work ended 15 January. Was that the end of the incident? Forget all about it?

What actually happened in Krasnoyarsk-35—was it really an emergency or the logical end to the working year? I am not going to judge whether discipline in the Army and at hazardous production sites is slipping, but I should think that the generals of the military-industrial complex are approaching the next holiday with a sinking heart. No one knows today what would have happened to tens of thousands of people had the "Fakel" workers had also had a drop to drink and begun unloading the "goods"....

Krasnoyarsk Kray is armed and very dangerous. First and foremost, it is a danger to itself. The kray center and the surrounding localities are a densely populated area crammed with the most hazardous production units: It has a mining and chemical combine where two military reactors were sealed last year but another one is still working and supplying Krasnoyarsk-26 with heat. It has in its possession, alongside the Yenisey River, an above-ground storage facility for spent nuclear fuel. Then there is "Kras mash," which produces the very latest submarine ballistic missiles, the "Yenisey" Chemical Combine—a recent examination of its industrial waste came as a shocking revelation even to the people whose job it is to ensure the population's safety....

"Irregular situations," as the weapons people themselves describe the emergencies, have happened, are happening, and will continue to happen. Bearing in mind the economic plight of the military-industrial complex in Krasnoyarsk and the psychological state among the collective, it is hard to be at all optimistic about our safety, you can only ask questions. Who can determine the maximum degree of risk for a territory and how and who can guarantee that this risk level is not being exceeded?

I. Zhmakov suggested that the governor of the kray ask the government to send a commission to the "Fakel" Plant to investigate aspects of safety. But surely what it needs is not a single intervention but permanent and independent monitoring of especially hazardous enterprises, including nuclear installations, and weapons.

During the official investigation of the New Year's incident it emerged that the military unit which had sent the missiles to the plant had committed a series of gross violations. The freight cars were supposed to have gone for repair, not to have been loaded with "goods" even though the command of the unit now denies that fact. It has also been established that all is not well with safety procedures at the "Fakel" Plant itself. But Zhmakov could not say precisely what was wrong. Why? Listen to his revelation:

"To this day not everything in the kray is being monitored by the kray authorities let alone the local authorities. Regulations are still in force which could stop the organs of management and the law enforcement organs from working and prevent them investigating the activity of defense enterprises. As in Krasnoyarsk-35. When it comes to giving help, for example, they are all very positive. But when it comes to something which

they would rather keep under wraps, they immediately protect themselves behind the regulations."

The military-industrial complex is reluctantly relinquishing its status of being a state within a state and its practice of total secrecy. But while that still exists it is obvious that talk of guaranteeing our safety is facile. Who knows whether they are hiding any secrets or vulnerable points? You can understand the generals and the directors but it is harder to understand the leadership of the kray, who bear full responsibility for what happens there and yet do not know what is really happening on the scattered islands of the military-industrial archipelago.

If V. Kretov, the mayor of Krasnoyarsk-26, had not known about the incident at the "Fakel" Plant and raised the alarm, this information about the accident would surely have remained buried within the bowels of the military-industrial complex. Had I. Zhmakov and the civil defense leadership not acted so forthrightly and zealously in informing everyone in Krasnoyarsk who needed to be informed, possibly the New Year in the kray center would not have been gloomy and few people would have known about the incident to this day. Had V. Gitin, a member of the Inner Soviet, not demanded a report from officials at the soviet, deputies would probably not have heard any explanations or details....

The head of the administration in Sosnovoborsk has proposed that especially hazardous loads entering the territory of Krasnoyarsk be subjected to inspection as they arrive. But who in the kray knows what cargo is in the military trains, when it is travelling, and where it is going and what kind of load is passing through Krasnoyarsk right now—nuclear warheads, ballistic missiles, or something else? The mayor of Krasnoyarsk-26 has proposed that the government be asked to keep the special regional services informed on this matter.

It is clear that while we have this hierarchy of information under the control of directors and functionaries and this concealment of information affecting safety, life in the cities of the military-industrial complex remains a game of Russian roulette: Today we were lucky but what about tomorrow?

Security Ministry Worried by 'Nuclear Blackmail'

*OW2801150993 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1435 GMT 28 Jan 93*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia's First Deputy Minister of Security Nikolay Galushko expressed deep concern about the possibility of nuclear blackmail in the Russian Federation. He told INTERFAX on Wednesday [27 January] that several anonymous threats in relation to nuclear power plants were made last year. He also said that all of these facts had been thoroughly investigated. Training programs for the protection of nuclear power plants were organized with this ministry's assistance.

Galushko also emphasized the importance of ensuring the security of the depots, where nuclear weapons to be eliminated in accordance with international agreements, will be stored. This refers above all to the storage of nuclear materials, including nuclear warheads. To quote Galushko, the military counter-intelligence is in charge of these problems.

He also stated that according to his Ministry's sources, there are no major terrorist groupings in the Russian Federation. The worst danger is coming from the "terrorist tendencies" in the zones of ethnic conflicts, including North Ossetia and Ingushetia, he continued. He also added that attempts are being made to revive the criminal groupings which are trying to influence the alignment of forces in the regional administrative bodies.

Last year, the Ministry of Security investigated several cases of terrorist threats against diplomatic missions in Moscow, said Galushko.

He also stated that implementing the resolutions of the 7th congress of people's deputies, connected with crime prevention, his Ministry is taking measures to intensify investigation activity. The Ministry of Security will also take part in drafting laws regulating such activity. To quote Galushko, on February 12, Moscow will host an all-Russia conference on combatting crime.

Not long ago, President Yeltsin announced plans to launch an all-out attack on crime, he said.

Asked by INTERFAX whether top officials should undergo a check in the Security Ministry before being offered a job, the way this is done in the US, Galushko said that to some extent this practice may help eradicate corruption.

Gromov Comments on Decommissioning Submarines

*PM2501160593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Jan 93 p 2*

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy: "Navy Commander Admiral Gromov Comments on the Problem of the Russian Navy Shipbuilding Program"]

[Text] Moscow, 21 Jan—Around 80 submarines have now been decommissioned from the Russian Federation Navy. Nuclear reactors have been removed from approximately one-third of them, and the planned removal process is under way on the rest. This was stated by Admiral Feliks Gromov, commander in chief of the Russian Federation Navy. He noted that, while waiting for the nuclear reactors to be removed, the submarines are laid up with their crews, who are monitoring all security matters on a day-to-day basis. As he put it, work is under way to mothball [dlitelnyy otstoy] the submarines, while work is being done on finding sites where the optimum regional dumps can be built for the materials

and waste products left over after recycling [utilizatsiya]. The commander in chief of the Russian Navy stressed that in 1992 the Russian Federation Government for the first time adopted a program for the recycling of submarines.

Adm. Feliks Gromov noted: "We have deliberately accelerated the process of decommissioning obsolete ships which are no longer combat-capable and have become rather dangerous to operate because of their old wiring."

On the basis of the new political and economic conditions we have now created a new 10-year shipbuilding program for the Russian Federation Navy, in order to ensure that the Navy poses the optimum deterrent and is capable of fulfilling the mission of safeguarding Russia's security in any part of the world, Adm. Gromov went on to say. The commander in chief noted that the questions of financing shipbuilding in 1992 was very complex. Nonetheless, the Russian Federation Government has defined shipbuilding priorities—particularly for the nuclear submarine shipbuilding center in Severodvinsk, and for submarines and surface ships—and, although the program has been cut somewhat, the process of replacing obsolete vessels with new ships will be continued, the admiral said. He noted that the shipbuilding program for the Russian Federation Navy is less than the program for the Union Navy was—since Russia has inherited just 60-64 percent of the former USSR's shipbuilding economic potential.

Turning to the manning of Navy subunits on a voluntary basis—under contract—the Navy commander in chief noted that only 10 percent of the posts set aside for this category of servicemen have been filled. Meetings of the Navy leadership are currently under way at the Navy's Main Staff to examine measures to increase the number of people serving with naval units under contract.

Options Weighed To Compensate Ukraine for N-Arms

*OW2701203693 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2005 GMT 27 Jan 93*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The commander-in-chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, Air Marshal Shaposhnikov thinks it possible that Russia could provide material compensation to Ukraine for strategic nuclear arms. "This is not the only way for the two countries to overcome their controversy," however, he said in an interview for INTERFAX.

"I believe Russia needs to make a careful assessment of the expense of dismantling the missiles, their transportation and utilization of nuclear charges," he said. All these estimates, he insists, should be made by highly qualified experts on both sides. "Only then will we find out who owes whom in reality," he reasons.

Marshal Shaposhnikov does not exclude the possibility that on final analysis, it would transpire that Russia's expenses would exceed the benefits it is expecting.

ARMENIA

Plants To Fill Russian, Mideast Weapons Orders

*NC3001063393 Yerevan SNARK in English 1342 GMT
29 Jan 93*

[Text] Yerevan, January 29 (SNARK)—The danger of closing or demilitarizing of many plants, which worked for the military industrial complex of the former USSR, has partly passed, Armenian Vice-Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan reported at the parliament. He noted the Republic's industry has got a number of Russian military orders, and also will work for the Middle East countries, which have "Soviet" weapons.

AZERBAIJAN

Defense Ministry Plans To Obtain, Use CWs

*NC2601155693 Baku AZERTAC in Azeri 1224 GMT
26 Jan 93*

[Text] Baku, 26 Jan (AZERTAC)—The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry headquarters has issued a statement in connection with reports disseminated by the Armenian mass media that Azerbaijan is preparing to launch an air strike against Armenian power plants, drop poisonous war materials on the population, and use cargo planes to bomb Khankendi [Stepanakert].

The statement, circulated today via AZERTAC channels, says that Azerbaijan has no intention of obtaining chemical weapons or using them.

The statement notes that Azerbaijan did not get any poisonous materials during the division of the former Soviet Army's property. This can be confirmed by the CIS Joint Armed Forces command, it notes.

The statement says the Armenian side has disseminated this lie to justify its aggression against Azerbaijani territory, adding that Armenian expeditionary corps fiercely shelled Agdam today. A child was killed and six people were gravely injured. The shelling caused considerable damage to the city.

According to information from the Defense Ministry, the enemy also shelled the border settlements in Azerbaijan's Zangelanskiy and Akstafinskiy Rayons today.

BELARUS

Shushkevich Remarks on Nuclear-Free Status

*LD2701173593 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1500 GMT 27 Jan 93*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Belarus is trying to acquire the status of a neutral nuclear-free state, Stanislav Shushkevich stated at a parliament session under way in Minsk. He stressed that, to do this, the republic is trying to speed up the withdrawal of strategic nuclear weapons which are Russia's property. At the same time, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet particularly noted that Belarus needs a 70 to 75,000-strong army to ensure the concept of Belarus's armed neutrality.

Government Plans Commercial Arms Exports

*OW2801154193 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1437 GMT 28 Jan 93*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Today, Belarus exports tanks, planes and fire arms, First Deputy Defence Minister Aleksandr Tushinskiy told INTERFAX.

He said that recently a batch of tanks had been purchased by Italy. Talks are being held on exporting specialized military computers, optical sights and guidance systems. Belarusian experts are exploring the possibility of producing Belarusian fire arms similar to the Uzi sub-machine gun.

Soon, Belarusian military colleges will start training foreign citizens. An agreement with India has been drafted already, said Tushinsky.

ESTONIA

Detained Ship With Scud Equipment Allowed To Sail

*WS2501130093 Tallinn BNS in English 1911 GMT
22 Jan 93*

[Text] Augusta, Sicily, 22 January 1993, BNS—The "Waalhaven", a ship belonging to the Estonian Shipping Company and rented out to a Dutch company, that was a month ago detained near Sicily, was on January 21st allowed to sail out but without cargo.

The ship had been detained since it was thought to carry equipment for the modernization of "Scud"-type missiles, AP reports. The cargo was meant for North Korea. The German experts who checked the ship stated that the machine tools the "Waalhaven" was transporting may be used at car factories as well as for rebuilding missiles. Therefore, all 27 containers were unloaded in Augusta, and the ship headed for Beirut. Next week, the same ship, or some other vessel will return to Augusta in order to take the cargo back to Hamburg.

The "Waalhaven" is a 4000-tonner and was built in 1979.

UKRAINE

Start I Negotiations With Russia Reported

To Focus on Implementing Start I

*OW2601163493 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1525 GMT 26 Jan 93*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The first round of Russian-Ukrainian negotiations devoted to issues concerning the implementation of the START-I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol started on Tuesday [26 January] in Kiev.

Yuriy Dubinin, ambassador at large, heads the group of Russian experts. Vitaliy Kononov, first deputy atomic energy minister, and Vyacheslav Zharkov, the chief of the Disarmament Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, are participating at the negotiations representing the Russian party. Yuriy Kostenko, the Environmental Protection Minister, heads the Ukrainian delegation; Colonel General Ivan Bizhan, deputy Defense Minister, and Valeriy Pavlyukov, deputy of the Machine Building, Defense Complex, and Conversion Ministry, are part of the Ukrainian delegation.

The parties agreed not to make any press releases until negotiations are completed.

Meanwhile the press center of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry reported to INTERFAX that the participants of the two-day negotiations will focus their attention on mechanisms to implement the START-I Treaty, in particular, the issues concerning re-deployment of the missiles destined for destruction to Russia and the further usage of fissile materials from the dismantled warheads.

To Discuss Warhead 'Compensation'

*OW2701143493 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1411 GMT 27 Jan 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian-Ukrainian talks for implementing the START-I treaty and the Lisbon Protocol continued on Wednesday [27 January] in the town of Irben near Kiev. The Russian delegation is headed by Ambassador Yuriy Dubinin, and the Ukrainian one by Minister of Environmental Protection Yuriy Kostenko.

According to the information provided by the Ukrainian MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], the sides have agreed that the focus of their problems, at the initial stage of their talks, will be the safety of the nuclear arms stationed on the territory of Ukraine, noting that certain progress has already been made in this area.

The Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister, Chairman of the National Disarmament Committee, Boris Tarasyuk indicated that Ukraine regards as one of the principle

issues the sides have to resolve the problem of compensation for the warheads Russia will remove from its territory. In his words, such compensation could take the form of uranium needed for the operation of Ukrainian nuclear power plants.

He emphasized that the talks do not only address the tactical [as received] ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] warheads, which have already been withdrawn to Russia.

Tarasyuk said, that Ukraine has already initiated discussions on the implementation of the START-I treaty with Belarus and Kazakhstan, characterizing, as quadripartite, the process of the disarmament talks among the republics of the former Soviet Union.

In compliance with Article 2 of the Lisbon Protocol, four republics of the former Soviet Union which have nuclear arms on their territory are obliged to conduct discussions and specify the number of warheads to be reduced by each party.

Commentary Examines Disarmament Stance

PM2201093193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Jan 93 First Edition p 7

["Commentary" by Vladimir Tyurkin, deputy editor of the CIS desk: "Nuclear Button Against a Backdrop of a Bronze Bell"]

[Text] Nuclear disarmament stood out among the conundrums in Russian-Ukrainian relations over which Presidents B. Yeltsin and L. Kravchuk fought for several hours during a row in Moscow. The problem emerged from nowhere, it would seem—after all Kiev dressed up its independence not least in its solemn commitment to adhere to the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Weapons (START I) as well as the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

But, subsequently, and unlike Minsk and Alma-Ata which kept their word, Kiev's position started to erode, it lost precision, and a quiet panic set in in NATO, primarily in Washington, on which 176 "Ukrainian" intercontinental missiles are targeted. Kiev moved from unconditional to conditional nuclear disarmament, demanding material compensation and guarantees of security.

No matter how events may develop henceforth, Kiev has at least managed to achieve three things: First, to leave a mark for ever that it held the fate of the START II Treaty between Russia and the United States in its hands, because the preceding one—START I—is unfulfillable without Kiev's participation; second, to receive \$175 million from the United States for the transportation, storage, and dismantling of missile weapons (\$1.5 billion was requested); and third, in the course of the Moscow summit meeting, to obtain promises from Moscow and Washington to give nuclear-free Ukraine guarantees of protection against each other—"counter" guarantees of

security, so to speak, which have brightened up the international landscape with something that is both unprecedented and, at the same time, painfully familiar—something along the lines of "counter plans."

But, seriously speaking, the 176 missiles and 30 strategic bombers with 1,656 warheads could have become the object of far greater worries for the international community if it had not been for the considered and sober approach that the Ukrainian leadership ultimately displayed.

There is a great deal of evidence in favor of the idea that the "nuclear rebellion" was a tactical maneuver with the purpose of obtaining quite specific advantages rather than a reflection of the positions of extreme nationalists in the Rada and certain para-political circles. The West is also noting this fact.

One of few journalists—if not the only one—to be allowed into the presidential apartments at the heat of Kiev's "anti-disarmament" campaign was a correspondent from the Italian journal PANORAMA. L. Kravchuk led his guest to the "nuclear button"—two grey telephones connecting his office with the command of the 43d Brigade. They are arranged far from the writing desk, and next to them stands a small bronze bell and a photograph of a fair-haired girl. "Before I give or refuse permission for the launching of missiles, I have to walk these three meters. Another few extra seconds for thinking," L. Kravchuk explains. "I want to see before me the photograph of my beloved granddaughter Masha. This bell is to remind me of the bell of Chernobyl." PANORAMA described the Ukrainian leader as "calm and level-headed," but without omitting to note casually that "he is one of the eight or nine heads of state who can destroy the planet."

Finally, the undoubted softening of the tone and the very recent unequivocal assurances by many Ukrainian officials of adherence to a nuclear-free course testify in favor of common sense. These assurances are also being corroborated by relevant agreements. In particular, it was arranged in Moscow that the governments would be instructed to immediately start talks with the aim of settling all problems connected with the implementation of the START I Treaty, including those concerning the disassembly, transportation, and destruction of warheads.

In the same way that the START II Treaty's ratification by the Russian parliament is an indispensable condition for its implementation, Ukraine's adherence to START I is conditioned by its approval by the Rada. There are practically no obstacles left on this path. The ball is in the president's court—it is up to him to submit it to the Ukrainian parliament.

Conditions for Withdrawal Set

*MK2901070193 Moscow KOMMERSANT DAILY
in Russian 27 Jan 93 p 2*

[Report by Viktoriya Kulakova and Vladimir Makartsev: "Mechanisms for the Withdrawal of Nuclear Arms From Ukraine Discussed"]

[Text] The first round of talks between Russia and Ukraine to determine the mechanisms for implementing the START-1 treaty (the withdrawal and nonproliferation of nuclear arms) began in the Kiev suburb of Ipre yesterday. The Russian delegation at the talks is led by Yuriy Dubinin, chairman of the state commission for talks with Ukraine, while the Ukrainian delegation is headed by Yuriy Kostenko, minister for environmental protection. The meeting is taking place behind closed doors.

According to observers, the meeting is to discuss a range of problems related to the storage of missiles and warheads before they are finally withdrawn from Ukraine in 1997, and to draw up a document confirming Boris Yeltsin's oral statement about Russia's nuclear security guarantees for Ukraine.

The meeting was preceded by talks in Kiev on 12 January between delegations of the Russian and Ukrainian Foreign Ministries. The Russian diplomats gave the Ukrainian side additional information that was intended to make it easier for the Ukrainian parliament to ratify START-1. By that time, Kiev had already received clarifications regarding the details of the signing by Russia and the United States of START-2 in the context of Russo-Ukrainian relations and national security guarantees. The present meeting therefore can be viewed as a continuation of the previous one.

It is thought that Ukraine will continue to insist, as a condition for its ratifying START-1, on an increase in U.S. aid from \$750 million to \$1.5 billion in addition to a share of Russia's profits from its sales of the dismantled nuclear warheads whose contents, after processing, can be used as fuel for nuclear power plants. More accurate figures may be given at the meeting because at the beginning of the year, the parliamentary foreign affairs commission of the Ukrainian Supreme Council had requested experts of the defense industry, security service, and the Institute for Strategic Studies to provide calculations of the political and economic consequences of nuclear disarmament.

The current talks are being held in a difficult atmosphere with various political forces trying to put pressure on the Ukrainian and Russian parliamentarians. Observers believe that the success of the talks will depend largely on the alignment of forces in the legislatures of the two countries.

Being a closed meeting, there is no telling when it may end. KOMMERSANT-DAILY will return to the subject of the Russo-Ukrainian talks on 30 January.

[Article includes the following boxed text:

The three conditions put forward by Ukraine to expedite its process of nuclear disarmament:

1. The nuclear powers should provide security guarantees.
2. Russia and the United States should subsidize the process of dismantling missiles.
3. Financial compensation should be paid for the storage of warheads that will be moved to Russia for destruction.]

'Substantial Advances' Reported

*LD2801191693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1722 GMT 28 Jan 93*

[ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Ryabikin and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow, 28 Jan—"The talks were fairly difficult; however, what is satisfying is that, apart from an exchange of views and an elucidation of a wide range of questions, we have managed to make fairly substantial advances," roving Ambassador Yuriy Dubinin stated. He headed the Russian delegation at the Russian-Ukrainian talks, which have ended in Kiev. Upon his return from Ukraine's capital, at an ITAR-TASS correspondent's request, he today commented on the results of these talks.

According to the leader of the Russian delegation, a considerable amount of work was done on the text of the agreement on carrying out warranty work and manufacturers' supervision [raboty po garantiynomu i avtorskomu nadzoru] of the running of the missile complexes of the strategic nuclear forces. Much work was done in search of methods and in discussing various options of dismantling, transporting, and destroying the nuclear warheads and elements of the nuclear complexes of the strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine, including issues of the processing of nuclear components.

Even though this is a very complicated area, Yuriy Dubinin noted, we are groping toward elements of mutual understanding in these matters, and this has led to setting up working groups that will deal with these problems in specific terms.

"We hope," the ambassador said, "for new meetings, and in the very near future at that." He noted that this work is extremely crucial, since its results will determine how quickly a path will be opened to real disarmament and to turning into reality everything that has been achieved under the START I Treaty, the Lisbon protocol, and the entire package of obligations relating to these documents.

Russian Ownership of Nuclear Arms 'Groundless'

*LD2401181593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 24 Jan 93*

[Text] The question of national ownership of strategic nuclear forces of the CIS remains open even after the Minsk summit. This was stressed in an interview given by Ivan Bizhan, first deputy minister of defense of Ukraine, to the ITAR-TASS agency. He noted that there were no grounds for declaring that strategic nuclear forces deployed on Ukrainian territory are the property of Russia. Ivan Bizhan emphasized that the Lisbon protocol states that CIS member states on whose territory nuclear weapons are located become equal successors to the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

IAEA Takes Control of Rovno Nuclear Power Plant

*OW1101141393 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1143 GMT 11 Jan 93*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The International Atomic Energy Agency has decided to establish permanent surveillance over the nuclear power plant in Rovno, Ukraine.

The IAEA will be monitoring the transportation, storage, and loading of the nuclear fuel, as well as the disposal of the waste, thus assuming responsibility for the plant.

Since Ukraine intends to have all nuclear armaments removed from its territory, the world community must have firm guarantees that all its nuclear fuel is used in its power industry, said a senior plant official, Nikolay Panashenko.

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